

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN  
WEST AFRICA: IN VIEW OF RECENT CONFLICTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2017

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 9-06-2017		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2016 – JUNE 2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Addressing the Challenges of Collective Security in West Africa: In View of Recent Conflicts				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)  Captain Ibrahima Diaw				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Understanding that achieving peace and security is a primary condition for an economic integration, ECOWAS has developed various approaches in resolving crises and overcoming threats within West Africa.  Using a qualitative research methodology, this study analyzes ECOWAS's response to crises in Cote d'Ivoire(2010), Guinea-Bissau and Mali(2012) to understand its challenges. Overall, ECOWAS is more successful in Guinea-Bissau and still appears to be in a reactionary posture.  This study reveals that ECOWAS' shortcomings reside in the timely exploitation of the information given by its early warning systems to prevent crises, some poor choice of emissaries to conduct negotiations, lack of consensus within its member states in contributing to a strong military coalition, the reticence of host nations to welcome an intervention force, and the full readiness of the ESF. By acting proactively on the basis of its warning systems findings, reconsidering the background of its mediators, and setting as membership condition the obligation of countries to contribute and support peace operations, the organization can address these challenges.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS ECOWAS, Collective Security					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES  107	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA: IN VIEW OF RECENT CONFLICTS, by Captain Ibrahima Diaw, 107 pages.

Understanding that achieving peace and security is a primary condition for an economic integration, ECOWAS has developed various approaches in resolving crises and overcoming threats within West Africa.

Using a qualitative research methodology, this study analyzes ECOWAS's response to crises in Cote d'Ivoire(2010), Guinea-Bissau and Mali(2012) to understand its challenges. Overall, ECOWAS is more successful in Guinea-Bissau and still appears to be in a reactionary posture.

This study reveals that ECOWAS' shortcomings reside in the timely exploitation of the information given by its early warning systems to prevent crises, some poor choice of emissaries to conduct negotiations, lack of consensus within its member states in contributing to a strong military coalition, the reticence of host nations to welcome an intervention force, and the full readiness of the ESF. By acting proactively on the basis of its warning systems findings, reconsidering the background of its mediators, and setting as membership condition the obligation of countries to contribute and support peace operations, the organization can address these challenges.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am most grateful to the Almighty God for his mercies and grace, without which I could not achieve this work.

I am greatly indebted to my thesis committee, chaired by Mr. Douglas E. Lathrop, my two readers Dr. David S. Pierson and Mr. Ronald T. Staver, whose constant and constructive guidance made it possible for me to succeed in this endeavor.

I am also grateful to the Directorate of Graduate Programs headed by Dr. Hernandez and Ms. Krueger for their professional guidance throughout the year.

I express my gratitude to Dr. John Modinger, my staff group advisor for his continuous and remarkable advice, my instructors for the knowledge they provide to me, and my classmates from staff group 5B for their professionalism and open-mindedness.

I also acknowledge the role of my sponsors (Arnie and Charlene Arts, Irene Lathrop, and Linda Hearne) for making my stay and that of my family in the U.S. comfortable throughout this year. Finally, my gratitude goes to my wife Khoudia and my daughter Khadidiatou for their support and encouragements.

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## ACRONYMS

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
ADSP	African Defense and Security Policy
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CS	Collective Security
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CSS	Center for Security Studies
EAC	East Africa Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Forces
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
MSC	Military Staff Committee/ Mediation and Security Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations

PSC	Peace and Security Council
R2P or RtoP	Responsibility to Protect
REC	Regional Economic Communities
REC/RM	Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms
RECAMP	<i>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix</i>
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### Background

The process of establishing and maintaining peace has changed over time. In the past, peace was achieved through agreements between two adversaries, or simply imposed by the strongest party. However, sustainable peace requires the commitment of various participants or actors. Thus, the concept of collective security, the transition from a two-party contract to agreement between states, requires a joint effort. Collective security is a broad concept and can encompass all processes, domains, and participants that contribute to its achievement. In this respect, it is important to understand how states and non-states actors contribute economically, socially, diplomatically, culturally, and militarily to its effectiveness.

Collective security can only be achieved through a joint action including local governments, people, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), civil societies, sub-regional, regional, and multinational organizations all working together towards mutual goals. Within the context of failed or failing countries where local government cannot prevent some atrocities related to genocide, crimes against humanity, and aggression, international law should prevail. Most of the time, any capable organization has the right or responsibility to intervene due to emergency requirements. This measure, concluded in 2005 by members of the United Nations (UN), is known as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). It appears as a new way to ensure collective security and can be considered as a “*erga omnes* law or legal act which applies as against every individual, person, or state without distinction” (Duhaime’s Law Dictionary 2016). Such obligations follow fewer

restrictions such as the mandatory conformity to the will of host countries in terms of sovereignty since governments are sometimes instigators of those problems.

Although the League of Nations, created in 1919, failed to prevent a second world war, nations-states have continued to create functional organizations, which aim at securing a safe environment for humanity. Those organizations can be international, regional, and sub-regional. The UN, the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are some of them. They all embody the will to ensure and promote peace and security in their different areas of concern. Practically, within their organizational system, specific instruments or mechanisms, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the African Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the Economic Community of West African States Standby Forces (ESF), are dedicated to implement collective security.

The UN is the most prominent organization that plays an important role in implementing collective security around the world. The UN charter, signed on 26 June 1945, clearly states in Chapter 1, Article 1 that the purposes and principles of the organization are:

to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. (United Nations 1945)

The UN has taken the lead in maintaining peace in Africa since the wave of independence in the 1960s. In 1960, UN Security Council Resolution 143 authorized a deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo (United

Nation Security Council 1960). Today, the UN still has either peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions in West Africa (Mali, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau).

Furthermore, the UN encourages and recognizes the commitment of regional and local organizations in maintaining collective security. Chapter 8, Article 52 of the UN Charter deals with regional arrangements. It states that “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action” as far as what they do conform to the principles of the organization (United Nations 1945). This gives the authority for regional (African Union) and sub-regional (ECOWAS) actors to respond to security concerns after having been approved by the UN.

Following the incentives of the UN to work on collective security in regional and sub-regional levels, the Constitutive Act of the African Union states the purpose in Article 3 is to “promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.” Moreover, in Article 4, all the sixteen points, which compose the principles of the document, are key elements to achieve collective security. The PSC is the standing organ for the prevention of conflicts, and security management within the organization, which is the key element that supports the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It is made up with different programs and instruments such as African Standby Force created in February 2004, the African Defense and Security Policy (ADSP), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) (African Union 2000). The AU does not have any peacekeeping force in West Africa.

However, it is engaged in Somalia, Sudan, and supports ECOWAS collective security missions through APSA.

In 2008, a memorandum of understanding relating to peace and security management in the continent was signed between AU and the Regional Economic Communities (REC). The sub-regional organizations, like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the ECOWAS, support the ASF construct through their different multinational brigades.

In a sub-regional context, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) is the prominent organization conducting collective security operations. The organization has experienced several peacekeeping operations with the Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) since 1990. Even if the tendency of military coups has been reduced, internal security issues, especially insurgencies, still exist in most of its member states. Therefore, the organization is still concerned about its ability to maintain an effective collective security capability. This study will focus on the approach by ECOWAS to achieve collective security. It will analyze the effectiveness of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) taking into account the implication of NGO, states governments, and civil society in their efforts to seek peace and security. The focus is based on the consideration that collective security is a long and daily process, which is best reachable by preventing the threat to insecurity. Any attempt to achieve collective security by ECOWAS, which is primarily an economic community, without a joint action of the other participants (NGO, states governments, and civil society) would be difficult. Even if ECOWAS has deployed forces in Mali and Guinea-



Bissau, some shortcomings still exist both in its mechanisms to prevent conflict and in the delay of the deployment of the forces as well as the dialogue between ECOWAS and the other security actors. The reasons are diverse, ranging from political, economic, to military. West Africa, like most other regions in the world, is facing multifaceted threats ranging from unemployment, poverty, health issues, terrorism, and lack of effective governance. ECOWAS seems to be the only legitimate and capable organization, which can relieve the populations from those threats. The majority of West African countries have experienced instability issues since early independence. Besides the lack of socio-economic development, some remained unstable because of lack of credible governmental institutions (Guinea-Bissau). Some are living in alternating periods of peace and war due to political disagreements (Côte d'Ivoire). Finally, some are living more or less peacefully, but are mixed with permanent insurgencies or rebellions (Mali). The case of Guinea-Bissau is typical because of its long history of conflicting political parties, which blocks a democratic transition of power. Côte d'Ivoire started to experience political unrest in 2000 after the death of Houphouët Boigny, the first president of the Republic. As for Mali, the Tuareg Rebellion started in 1962, and demanded independence of the northern part of the country known as "Azawad." The Tuareg Rebellion was mostly active in 2012.

The aforementioned situations did not favor an effective collective security atmosphere. In most of these cases, the armed conflicts resulted in disastrous consequences. The reason is the different actors (ECOWAS, civil societies Organizations, and local governments), dedicated to collective security promotion, encountered issues in putting together their efforts to prevent or solve those conflicts. For

example, it would be difficult for a NGO to operate within a country if the local government does not show the will to collaborate and welcome it.

Considering recent conflicts in West Africa, if collective security was more or less achieved in some countries, it was less successful in others. The conflicts and crises broke out in Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali between 2010 and 2012 were some examples.

Since its independence in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has experienced a perpetual military and political instability, and has already registered four peace and security operations conducted by ECOWAS or the UN. The unstable environment, which led to the creation of the ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) in November 2012, started after the death of the former president, Malam Bacai Sanhá, on January 2012. Facing a political disagreement between political parties during the presidential election, a military coup was carried out between the first and second terms. Understanding the situation that used to prevail in that country, ECOWAS sent a small force of five hundred soldiers, composed of Nigeria, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo. The mission of that force was to support the securitization of the political transition process and the Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Amar 2014).

On the other hand, in 2012, the ECOWAS reaction was too slow in Mali. The sub-regional organization failed to intervene early in Mali in 2012. Profiting by the military coup that overthrew President Amadou Toumani Toure, various armed groups joined efforts, overran the Malian Armed Forces, took two-thirds of the territory, and declared the independence of the northern region, the Azawad. The ECOWAS response was not the same when the decision was made to deploy a force into Mali in 2012.

Despite two resolutions of the UNSC (2071, 2085) supporting the deployment of a military contingent, ECOWAS was too late in its deployment. Finally, France, supported early on by the Republic of Chad (which is not an ECOWAS member state), initiated Operation Serval to defeat the armed group. It is only after the beginning of this intervention that ECOWAS started deploying soldiers, beginning the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) mission (Bannelier and Christakis 2013, 855).

Similarly, in 2010, not all of the ECOWAS member states agreed to deploy a force in Côte d'Ivoire to force Laurent Gbagbo to surrender the presidency after his defeat during the elections. In Côte d'Ivoire, France's military force, Licorne, tacitly supported the *Forces Nouvelles* of the newly elected President Alassane Ouattara to overthrow the forces of the former President Laurent Gbagbo.

The period of 2010-2016 corresponds to a moment when many ECOWAS member states were facing internal security problems that would not allow them to deploy security forces outside their countries. As an illustration, Nigeria, the biggest country within the organization, was dealing with the Boko Haram problem.

### Research Questions

This thesis will primary answer the following question: Based upon experiences with recent conflicts in West Africa, how can ECOWAS achieve an optimal collective security capacity for its member states?

To answer it, a few secondary questions will be examined:

1. What are the fundamental aspects of collective security?
2. What mechanisms has ECOWAS used to achieve collective security?

3. What has been the success or the failure of using these mechanisms to meet the fundamentals of collective security in West Africa?
4. What types of conflicts is ECOWAS Standby Forces (ESF) more likely able to resolve?
5. What should be done to increase collective security capabilities within ECOWAS?

### Assumptions

It can be assumed any initiative without the association of partners (AU, UN, Civil Societies Organizations, and local governments) will be unsuccessful. At the same time, collective security in West Africa will be difficult to achieve as member states are tied to their sovereignty and demonstrate concerns whenever an intervention is necessary. With the transnational character of the terrorist threat, many countries in West Africa are unable to ensure security for their population by themselves. Moreover, the porosity of frontiers is the reason why insecurity in one country can lead to the instability of the sub-region. Therefore, no member state will be able to respond unilaterally against terrorist groups.

### Definitions

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): It is an African architecture Union adopted in 2002, and built around structures, objectives, principles, and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. Its main pillar is the PSC, which is supported by various structures, namely the Commission,

Panel of the Wise, CEWS, African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. A key part of the APSA is the relationship between the African Union (AU), which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa, and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (REC/RM) (African Union Peace and Security Department 2002).

Civil Society: Civil society is the “third sector” of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs. In this study, civil society can include all those individuals, religious, and non-profit organizations operating outside of governments and profit sectors, armed with the will to provide service to citizens, including security (United Nations 2016a).

Collective Security: “Collective security refers to a collective action in response to a collectively identified threat” (Orakhelashvili 2010, 4). As used in this study, collective security is the joint action of the West African community supported by others actors, such as the international community, NGOs, local governments, and CSOs to ensure peace and security within the West African sub-region.

Peacebuilding: It involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict. It addresses core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seeks to enhance the capacity of the State to carry out effectively and legitimately its core functions (United Nations 2008, 18).

Peace Enforcement: Type of peace operations, which is discussed in Chapter 7 of the United Nation's Charter: "Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" (United Nations 2016b).

Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping is designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace (United Nations 2008, 18).

Responsibility to Protect (RtoP or R2P): The particularity of R2P is the tacit obligation of states to intervene when certain threats or types of violence occur in a country and the latter is incapable or unwilling to protect its population. The process may not follow some of the habitual protocols as far as those threats are against humanity. The expression was adopted in September 2005, at the UN World Summit on the agreement that:

All Member States formally accepted the responsibility of each State to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. At the Summit, world leaders also agreed that when any State fails to meet that responsibility, all States (the "international community") are responsible for helping to protect people threatened with such crimes. Should peaceful means – including diplomatic, humanitarian and others – be inadequate and national authorities "manifestly fail" to protect their populations, the international community should act collectively in a "timely and decisive manner" – through the UN Security Council and in accordance with the UN Charter – on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with regional organizations as appropriate. (United Nations 2009)

Tuareg: An ethnic group dispersed between the Republics of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Libya, and Algeria. This group has been claiming the independence of the northern region of Mali known as “Azawad.” They have been struggling since 1962 (Cline 2013, 619-622).




Figure 1. Tuaregs Ethnicity: Settlement and Claimed Territory

Source: Scott Stearns, “US, Algeria See Moderate Tuaregs as Key to Ending Mali Partition,” *Voice of America* (blog), October 30, 2012, accessed 26 December 2017, <http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/10/30/us-algeria-see-moderate-tuaregs-as-key-to-ending-mali-partition/>.

### Limitations

Collective security is a broad concept, and the subject of many articles. However, those analyses are based on specific threats or conflicts, and in specific contexts. Therefore, what is applied to one situation may not be applicable to another. This situation leads to consult most recent materials for the effectiveness of this study. As a result, the research findings of this study may be partially applicable to another situation because the context may change. Finally, the inability to interview ECOWAS personnel will be a restriction to this research.

### Scope and Delimitations

This study intends to examine the constraints, which lead to the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS's collective security capability in dealing with some crises in West Africa. It will examine why ECOWAS, the ESF, and other security supporting actors (governments, NGOs, CSOs, etc.) meet some shortcomings in some occasions, but succeed in others when facing potential crises. The objectives will be to find the reasons of their inability to prevent and react effectively when a conflict breaks out. The study will be limited to the cases of Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau from 2010 to 2012. In this case, it will not only deal with the actions or structure of ECOWAS forces and other actors, but with the preliminary actions they develop as preventive measures.

### Significance of Study

Since their independence, African countries have suffered a lot from crises related to health, political dialogue, armed group proliferation, economic, and social problems. Despite the tremendous efforts of regional and sub-regional organizations, many of the



countries are still among the lowest level of development in the world. Since most of these crises end up in conflicts, it would be more effective to solve the causes of those crises before they escalate. Presently, as the transnational terrorist threat is seeking for a favorable and unsecure environment to prosper, one troubled zone in West Africa can lead to another. Therefore, it is important that West African countries work on prevention. This must be primarily done by the existing organizations created to prevent conflicts, but other actors must support them. To achieve this goal, it not enough to have a well-structured reaction force and a sub-regional organization. It needs to review the process of employing that force, and define some clear bases on which that organization should rely on to be stronger, and have the capability to take responsibility in case of emergent situations, which can affect the whole community. ECOWAS member states cannot achieve a social and economic development unless they can ensure a sustainable security environment.

### Summary

The development of West Africa's economy, society, and politics continue to be plague by the permanent atmosphere of insecurity. Some international organizations, like the UN, have played an important role in reestablishing a secure order since independence. Presently, regional and sub-regional African organizations are leading peace operations in order to gain more legitimacy. In West Africa, besides the adoption of a collective security mechanism, ECOWAS must be more diligent in its decision-making and collaborate with other supporting actors like the international community, NGOs, and CSOs to be effective. The next chapter will examine the literature on this

topic to understand the requirements of collective security and the role of the different actors in West Africa.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The purpose of this study is to address the ECOWAS' collective security approach. This chapter analyzes theories of the concept collective security (origin, evolution, and requirements) developed through different perceptions from a general observation of the concept and specific studies of the African region. It will further examine the ECOWAS approach to collective security. Finally, it will look at contributing factors to collective security in West Africa and their relations with the sub-regional mechanism.

#### The Concept of Collective Security

##### Origin and Evolution

The concept of collective security dates back from ancient Greece. According to Tsagourias and White, the Delphic Amphictyony can be considered as a means of achieve collective security. As a religious association of ethnic groups with a council in which all groups are represented, (Athens and Thebes having a permanent vote), the members swore not to destroy any member city, but to take revenge against any member who forfeited that oath. The Greeks also experienced alliances to maintain security. The Peloponnesian League, formed by Sparta and Athens, two hegemonic powers, guaranteed freedom of all the members. However, the alliance was short lived, ended by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. A new project of guaranteeing peace and security, known as the Pan Hellenic League, was created. Its aim was to establish a common peace, which

should provide a forum to protect the community and establish a process by which conflicts might be resolved without recourse to war. These organizations did not aim at prohibiting war, but regulating and limiting it among the members. In this respect, Greek organizations could be seen from two aspects: They look to protect members from outside threats, but they look also to settle a peaceful order internally. They also refer to collective security through a religious side. They analyze the concept of “just war,” which was developed following the Christianization of the Roman Empire as a contributing element to collective security. This theory focused on the conditions under which war is to be waged, and included three principles: right authority, just cause, and right intention. This theory emphasizes the legitimacy and righteousness of war embodied by the right authority, the causes, and goals of war. However, this option does not exclude the resort to punishing war against states that have committed grievous violations of the law of nations, and sovereigns who oppress their citizens (Tsagourias and White 2013, 4-7).

Immanuel Kant’s project of perpetual peace defends the necessity for states to get together in order to achieve collective security. He thinks that a federation, where every state’s right will be guaranteed, can provide peace and security. In that state of perpetual or eternal peace, there will be no supreme authority. Its aim will be to terminate war and the sum of agreements of individual states will count the most (Kant 2011, 4-10).

All these alliances did not succeeded in achieving a lasting peace. Even if they participated in regulating war, they established a balance of power that favored different opposing parties, each one defending its own organization. Tsagourias and White mention their shortcomings as follows:

The contribution of alliances to security is quite paradoxical. Alliances provide security to states against external threats, and provide for intra-systemic security by grouping states together; but they are not always able to provide inter-systemic security. Alliances may provoke wars because they often become antagonistic or hostile to each other, or because one alliance becomes over powerful and able to disregard existing conventions. (Tsagourias and White 2013, 11)

New collective security systems emerged in the early twentieth century. The League of Nations and, later, the UN, were the illustrations of that period. The aim of collective security within these organizations was more ambitious, as expressed in the covenant of the League of Nations to “promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security among states on the basis of international law; open and just relations among states; and a mutual commitment not to resort to war” (The League of Nations 1919).

Recently, collective security has become an obligation for UN members. Based upon the inability to prevent war crimes and genocide in recent conflicts, the concept of collective security has evolved to encompass the notion of the R2P. Ramesh Thakur analyzes it as the “authority of international consensus over individual state consent as the foundation of legal obligation” when such atrocities are perceptible in an area even without the consent of that country. R2P’s objectives are to change the conceptual language from humanitarian intervention to responsibility to protect, pin the responsibility to state authorities at the national level – and the UNSC at the international level – to ensure that interventions, when they take place, are done properly (Thakur 2006, 244-247).

Collective security is not a static concept. It changes according to the evolution and types of threats (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and environmental

degradation). Therefore, its achievement requires adaptation, more actors, and new approaches. Tsagourias and White describe this evolution of the concept:

Throughout history, there have been a number of collective security projects, with the United Nations being the current and probably most enduring. In brief general terms, collective security (CS) is a legal-political construct to maintain international peace and security by treating all threats as indivisible and by centralizing and institutionalizing decision-making and action in this respect. As stated by the High Level Panel in *A More Secure World*, a CS system entails commitments, responsibilities, institutions, strategies, and resources. More specifically, it entails institutions that will make decisions, take action, and generally, assume responsibilities for peace and security. (Tsagourias and White 2013, xi)

This evolution of the concept of collective security is the source of different perceptions of the concept and many definitions.

### Definitions of the Concept

In defining collective security, Tsagourias and White used two complementary versions. All of them have the same objective, but they differ in their scope and control measures. In the first version, they refer to the League of Nations, and lay out the objectives of the organization. They mention collective security as a joint action developed by a group of states or community with an ultimate goal to guarantee security of all the members as individuals and as a whole. Any apparent threat against a member of the community, which will likely affect the whole community, should be taken into account; but all actions should be according to the rules set by that community of states. They conceive collective security as a system whereby the security of each member of the collectivity, and of the collectivity as a whole is guaranteed by common action, based on prescribed rules and methods. However, this perception of the concept does not mention how influential the institution should be to prescribe the rules and control that

organization. This was certainly why the League of Nations could not prevent countries from resorting to illegal war. In the second version, they refer to the UN collective security system, and insist on its legality as an organ of control. They define collective security as a “global public order institution for maintaining international peace” through collective action. This public order institution should have a normative role. They use the term “public” because they qualify collective security as a manifestation of many countries’ desire to form one institution, where they are represented in order to deliver a public goal such as international peace (Tsagourias and White 2013, 20).

Collective security can be also seen as permanent duty for all states and countries. According to Johnson and Niemeyer, collective security is a system based on the universal obligation of all nations to join forces against an aggressor state as soon as the fact of aggression is determined by established procedure (Johnson and Niemeyer 1954, 19). This definition seems to be close to collective self-defense, which Stahn includes in the field of collective security. Stahn states, “Collective self-defense is at the heart of a collective security process” (Stahn 2002, 3-4).

As for Orakhelashvili, his definition insists on two things: the legitimate character of the concept, and the difference between collective security and collective self-defense. He states first collective security as “normally introvert, in contrast to the extrovert collective self-defense treaties meant to counter an external aggression.” This partial definition considers the concept just at a level of regional or sub-regional organizations. However, he recognizes that the best way to ensure collective security is through “an appropriate international machinery, binding obligations clearly set forth in legal instruments, a multilateral treaty, whereby contracting parties create an international

agency vested with the power to employ force against aggressors.” However, this definition seems to be partial as those aggressors may be simply offenders; that is to say, members of the collectivity. Finally, he comes out with a vast definition after analyzing the UN actions related to collective security. He states that “collective security is overarching and broad, and can include in itself a variety of tasks such as conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement, as required to enable the relevant institution to deal with threats as their gravity and magnitude require” (Orakhelashvili 2010, 12-15).

Ultimately, collective security is a legal security arrangement where groups of countries pledge co-operative joint action to face threats to their economic, social, political, cultural, or territorial sovereignty. This threat may be thwarted preventively or reactively, by addressing internal and external policies, using sanctions, or force. It requires various actors and different procedures.

#### Requirements and Ways to Achieve Collective Security

To achieve collective security, it is necessary to deal with external as well as internal threats. Absence of conflict does not guarantee a peaceful and secure environment. Other non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields threaten peace and security. Dealing with collective security includes both dealing with “negative peace” (interstate threat) and “positive peace” (intrastate threats). “Positive peace” is related to domestic security, and can be mostly considered as the root to insecurity in many countries. To prevent this root of insecurity from turning into crises, political power must be transferred legally and orderly. Governments and supporting partners must promote social equality, freedom,



and employment opportunities. These requirements also engage international, regional, and sub-regional institutions. The decisions in collective security should follow a certain order. Taking the UN organization as an example of a collective security enabler, there are several ways to achieve collective security. Those ways can be dissuasive, preventive, peaceful, coercive, reactive, and restorative (Tsagourias and White 2013, 23- 29).

The process to follow in achieving collective security comprises diplomacy, responsibility to protect, arms control, and preventive security. It also implies the participation of CSOs. Additionally, principles and values related to international and collective security laws, such as peace, statehood, self-determination, human rights, and, more controversially, democracy should be respected. All these principles can be part of state building (Tsagourias and White 2013, 193-208).

Dealing with collective security in Africa, Salomon Hailu insists on the support of Western countries, and the necessity of the African Union country members to support the organization's activities. He thinks they should be involved in helping Africa understand the root causes of threats in many ways through intelligence gathering, security information, diplomacy and negotiation, economy, and governance. Such support would be a way to avoid controversies, which are raised about some military interventions of Western countries in their former colonies. Some people see those interventions as an interference in their affairs. Realizing the African Union's peacekeeping operations lack of finance and logistical support, he also proposes country members show a willingness to increase contributions, and be engaged in security sector reforms, as many of their military forces are committed primarily to the protection of the "ruling party" (Hailu 2012, 50-64).

Tsagourias and White have identified the following six key considerations concerning the maintenance of collective security, including the use of force:

1. Recognize subjectivity in interpreting and implementing the purposes of CS.  
  
This approach tends to replace collective security with national security. It gives a freedom of action to CS actors, but it can lead to anarchy, especially if they are tied to their own interests.
2. CS actors should be ready to enforce the agreement of a CS organization that has legitimacy. In this way, the reaction of CS actors may be quicker, as it requires only an agreement at a specific level within the CS institution.
3. CS should allow actions by actors when the threat to the peace is also a core crime (genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes). This approach will allow a quicker response to minimize human suffering.
4. CS should require a resolution from one recognized CS institutions but with necessity to consult another organ.
5. CS should require a resolution from just one CS institution or CS organ but recognizing that states and other CS actors can interpret that resolution to enable them to respond to that threat.
6. CS should require a resolution from a specific CS organ within the CS institution, like the Security Council within the UN (Tsagourias and White 2010, 54-56).

All these proposals strive for a quick response in the process of the implementation of collective security. However, some of the proposals that allow individual initiative could bring disagreements.

According to Orakhelashvili, the validity and feasibility of collective security depends on the selfless commitment of states. States must bear in mind that they belong to an entity in international politics with overarching interests, goals and perspectives, and must fight threats against foes in the same way they do for friends. In this perspective, he thinks that limiting collective security into alliance systems is not the ideal way as it expresses to some extent a preference in implementing collective security. Instead, he recommends, security cooperation based on the respect of a world of sovereign states subject to no higher authority, and an equilibrium of power between states. His conclusion is that collective security should be a legal arrangement operating in the existing legal environment, and developed through the ordinary process of international law (Orakhelashvili 2011, 6-11). However, this vision seems to be difficult to achieve. Besides, it remains questionable whether an equilibrium between countries can guarantee collective security as far as they will still have their own interests. One additional factor is that collective security can be more effective by promoting preventive actions.

This is the approach regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the African Union, and Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), often adopt to respond effectively to crises.

### The African Union's Collective Security Approach

The creation of the PSC, as an organ of the African Union, translates the desire of the continental organization to achieve sustainable collective security. The PSC is at the heart of the APSA. The PSC is at the center in implementing APSA's roadmap 2016-2020 five priorities, which are conflict prevention, crisis-conflict management, post-

conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, strategic security issues, coordination, and partnerships (African Union, Peace and Security Department 2015, 22).

As the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, the PSC is meant to act as a collective security and early warning instrument for timely and efficient response to both existing and emerging conflict and crises in Africa. Established by the first Summit of the AU in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, the council consists of fifteen members, ten of whom are elected for two years, and five for three years. Unlike the UNSC, where the five permanent members wield the veto, none of the fifteen members of the PSC has a veto; all members are entitled to one vote each. Its purpose is to maintain peace and security in Africa (African Peace and Security Department 2010, 22-32).

The Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, and the Special Fund, collectively referred to as APSA, support the PSC. The Continental Early Warning System has some sections within the sub-regional organizations. It is meant to provide the PSC with an opportunity of taking the required action after due consideration of potential crises. Article 12 of the PSC protocol specifies that the CEWS should consist of an observation and monitoring center known as the “situation room.” The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the CEWS to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa, and recommend the best course of action. As for the Panel of the Wise, Article 11 states that it could be deployed to support efforts of the PSC. Consisting of five highly respected African personalities, the Panel’s role is to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on matters relating to the

promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and stability on the continent. The Panel has been involved in many mediations since its establishment. The Peace Fund remains small and precarious. On average, only 6 percent of the regular budget is allocated to the Peace Fund. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is mandated to advise the PSC on questions relating to military and security issues that are on its agenda. It consists of senior military officers. The Peace Fund, established under Article 21 of the PSC protocol is meant to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the AU, including contributions from member states and other private sources (African Union Peace and Security Council 2002, 16-18). However, the high-level, 2007 Audit of the African Union concluded that there is cause for concern regarding the insufficient funding of peace operations in Africa (African Union 2007, 102).

In general, the protocol relating to the establishment of PSC includes a legal and doctrinal framework within and between member states through military and non-military activities. The PSC utilizes the potential of sub-regional organizations within the APSA.

Article 13 of the PSC Protocol provides that “an African Standby Force shall be established. Such force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary components with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at an appropriate notice.” The ASF is composed of various sub-regional standby forces from ECOWAS, SADC, AMU, EAC, and ECCAS. The African Head of States in Addis Ababa approved the ASF policy framework document in July 2004 (African Union Peace and Security 2002, 19). The ASF’s role is to provide peacekeeping

forces on a high-level readiness, capable of rapid deployment in response to a request by the UN or the AU or a given region. In 2010, the ASF was expected to grow to five multinational brigades, each comprising three thousand troops, ready to operate as an African Rapid Reaction Force. Later on, the ASF increased up to 6,500 soldiers each for each brigade (Wulf and Debiel 2009, 15). Currently, there are five sub-regional brigades referred as the sub-regional standby forces. .

1. North African Standby Force (NASBF), with its headquarters in Cairo
2. East Africa Standby Force (EASF), with its headquarters in Kenya.
3. ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), with its headquarters in Nigeria.
4. Central Africa Standby Force (CASF), with its headquarters in Gabon
5. SADC Standby Force (SSF), with its headquarters in Botswana.




Figure 2. Composition of African Standby Forces  
as divided by Sub-Regional Organization

Source: African Peace and Security Department, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): Assessment Study*, 2010, 37, accessed 20 December 2016, [https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/african\\_peace\\_and\\_security\\_architecture.pdf](https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/african_peace_and_security_architecture.pdf).

These forces are planned to be used in six different scenarios. Only the AU summit of Heads of States can authorize scenario 6.

Table 1. ASF Deployment scenarios		
Scenario	Description	Deployment Requirement (From manmade resolution)
1	AU/Regional military advice to a political mission	30 days
2	AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN Mission	30 days
3	Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission	30 days
4	AU Peacekeeping Force for Chapter VI and Preventive Deployment Missions (and Peace Building)	30 days
5	AU Peacekeeping Force for complex multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions including those involving low level Spoilers	90 days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days
6	AU Intervention. e.g., In genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.	14 days with robust military force

*Source:* African Peace and Security Department, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): Assessment Study*, November 2010, 38, accessed 20 December 2016, [https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/african\\_peace\\_and\\_security\\_architecture.pdf](https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/african_peace_and_security_architecture.pdf).

To make the ASF operational, three phases of training have been followed from 2004 to 2010. Phase 1 focused on individual training conducted at member states level, and included planning elements (PLANELM), headquarters, brigade, and logistic base levels. This phase also provided the baseline documentation tools. Phase 2 was the consolidation of ASF tools and concept of operations, and capability development. In this stage, individual groups, such as the planning elements, brigade headquarters, logistic bases, and units were to train collectively. Phase 3 validated the procedures of the ASF,

including the Continental Peace and Security Architecture. The culmination of collective training was conducted in the form of seminars, joint command post exercises (CPX), and joint field training exercises (FTX), such as AMANI (African Peace and Security Department 2010, 38-39).

In 2010, the assessment of the ASF, done by some AU and sub-regional organizations experts, did not show an overall readiness of the different components. The results showed some disparities. The overall ASF was not ready, and not all the sub-regional forces had the same level of readiness. In addition, if the operating procedures and the troops seemed to be ready, the logistics and the civilian element did not follow. Besides, not all brigades had the same level of readiness. As the results of that assessment showed, many points were unchecked and marked “x.”

Table 2. 2010 Overall Status of Readiness of the ASF							
	<b>Benchmarks</b>	AU	ECOWAS	SADC	EASF	NARC	ECCAS
(a)	(b)						
1	Framework Documents	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	MOU	✓	In Progress	✓	✓	x	X
3	PLANELM	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
4	Bde HQ	PSOD	✓	x	✓	✓	X
5	Pledged Units	NA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
6	Log Depots	X	X	X	X	X	X
7	Centres of Excellence	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
8	Bde Operational	NA	X	X	X	X	X
9	Civilian Components	In Progress	In Progress	In Progress	In Progress	In Progress	In Progress
10	Police Component	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Source: African Peace and Security Department, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): Assessment Study*, November 2010, accessed 20 December 2016, [https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/african\\_peace\\_and\\_security\\_architecture.pdf](https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/african_peace_and_security_architecture.pdf).



The African Union cannot alone assume collective security within the whole continent. Therefore, a decentralization of the tasks is necessary. In this respect, ECOWAS, as a sub-regional organization, has developed some collective security mechanisms that existed prior to the adoption of the ASF concept by the AU.

### ECOWAS Collective Security Framework

Collective security is not an aim or a value, but a mechanism for attaining these ends (Tsagourias and White 2013, 3). Understanding this, West Africa, via ECOWAS, has made important strides toward making its peace and security efforts more systematic, consistent and strategic (Lucey and Arewa 2016, 2).

Created on 28 May 1975 by the treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS is a 15-member regional group (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d' Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo), with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of activity of the constituting countries. It aims to achieve a collective self-sufficiency for the member states by means of economic and monetary processes creating a single large trading bloc. Its structure and decision making elements consists of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Community Tribunal, Community Court of Justice, the Executive Secretariat, the ECOWAS Parliament, and the specialized Commissions. However, understanding that it cannot achieve its objectives without security, ECOWAS was engaged in peace and security resolutions. On 29 May 1981, its members signed a Protocol on Mutual Defense Assistance that provided for the establishment of an Allied Armed Force of the Community. They also signed a non-aggression protocol in 1990, and started deploying forces in military operations. One of

its first mission was the deployment of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia in 1990. The ECOWAS Summit of December 1999 agreed on a Protocol for the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security. The Mechanism has a Council of Elders, as well as a Security and Mediation Council. ECOWAS's fundamental principles are:

1. Equality and inter-dependence of Member States;
2. Solidarity and collective self-reliance;
3. Inter-State co-operation, harmonization of policies and integration of programs;
4. Non-aggression between Member States;
5. Maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness;
6. Peaceful settlement of disputes among member states, active co-operation between neighboring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development;
7. Recognition, promotion, and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights;
8. Accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development;
9. Recognition and observance of the rules and principles of the Community;

10. Promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each member state as envisaged by the Declaration of Political Principles adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991 (ECOWAS 2016a).




Figure 3. ECOWAS Country Members

*Source:* ECOWAS Home Page, ECOWAS Country Members, accessed 27 December 2017, <http://www.suggestkeywords.com/ZWNvd2FzIGNvdW50cmllcw>.

ECOWAS has built a mechanism of peace and security with the support of the African Union, state partners, and non-state partners, such as CSOs.

ECOWAS's approach to collective security is based on the guidelines of the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC). ECOWAS has various institutions

dealing with peace and security. Like the PSC within the AU, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) is one of the most decision-making organs within ECOWAS. It has taken very intrusive and binding decisions including the deployment of peace operations to Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia in 2003. Institutionally, as one of the most active components of the ECOWAS peace and security architecture, the Defense and Security Council (DSC) supports the MSC. Moreover, ECOWAS has at its disposal a Council of the Wise established. The council has been at the forefront in preventive interventions in West Africa. Its members have been deployed to backstop ongoing mediation efforts in many countries such as Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. However, the designation of its members by their governments could impair their impartiality (African Peace and Security Department 2010, 24-54).

ECOWAS has also developed, through time, its Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). This network undertakes risk mapping, observation, and analysis of social, economic and political situations in the sub-region that have the potential to degenerate into conflict. In this respect, four zones offices were established as follows:

Zone 1: Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal, with Banjul, Gambia as the headquarters.

Zone 2: Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Niger with headquarters in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Zone 3: Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone with headquarters in Monrovia, Liberia.

Zone 4: Benin, Nigeria, and Togo with headquarters in Cotonou, Benin.

The zone offices are like observation and monitoring offices. In order to respect state sovereignty, ECOWAS has relied on open information sources. ECOWAS-trained civil liaison officers, members of civil society, in each zone capital, transmit this open information. Each office works in liaison with a government representative and a representative of civil society who is most of the time a representative of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). Each week, national focal points have to fill in an ECOWARN risk indicator form. Once the various weekly reports and the incident reports on the situation in countries in question have been analyzed, and the indicator form has been filled out. Every Monday, the head of the zone office sends his report to the ECOWAS Early Warning Department in Abuja (Sahel and West Africa Club 2009). The reports coming from these zones assist the ECOWAS Commission President and the MSC in devising suitable response strategies. Four options are available to diffuse any potential threat to security identified in the various zones. They include: (1) the setting up of a fact finding commission; (2) the use of the good offices of the Commission President; (3) calling on the services of a Council of the Wise; and if all else fail; (4) the employment of military force. The Council of the Wise can be seen as a traditional African conflict resolution method. Made up of fifteen eminent persons, one from each member state, this council is charged with the task of facilitating negotiation, mediation, and conciliation in a potential conflict. The focus on conflict prevention and early response is a step in the right direction (Kabia 2011, 5).

When crisis prevention fails, ECOWAS can rapidly deploy a military force for intervention. Preceded by the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), this

force is known as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). It was created in 2003, following the adoption of the 2002 African Peace and Security Architecture.

#### ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

ECOMOG was the first African regional initiative on peacekeeping. The development of ECOMOG is held up as a model for the regional brigades, and it gives West Africa a head start in the ASF process (Vines and Middleton 2008, 17). The ECOMOG missions were constituted after crises broke out.

According to Article 22 of the 1999 Protocol, relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security, ECOMOG's missions included: observation and monitoring, peacekeeping and restoration of peace, humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster, and enforcement of sanctions including embargoes, preventive deployment, peace-building, disarmament, and demobilization, policing activities as well as the control of fraud and organized crime, and any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security (ECOWAS 1999, 18).

In May 1990, ECOWAS first successfully deployed ECOMOG in Liberia despite the opposition from the rebel leader Charles Taylor. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG was also able to reinstate the ousted President Ahmet Tejan Kabbah in 1998. In 1999, ECOMOG intervened to restore peace in Guinea Bissau following a revolt of the national army. ECOWAS also deployed a peacekeeping mission to Côte d'Ivoire December 2002, and in Liberia, for the second time in August 2003. However, misunderstandings sometimes persisted. For example, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, while Ghana favored traditional peacekeeping strategies, Nigeria adopted more robust enforcement action. This difference

of strategy led to problems with inter-contingent coordination and chain of command. These tensions were exacerbated by the lack of effective ECOWAS oversight of both forces, and the sub-regional resentment of Nigeria's hegemonic position (Kabia 2011, 3-4). The reliance on Nigeria was problematic as Nigerian commanders were accused of paying little attention to non-Nigerian subordinates. Additionally, the split between the Francophone and Anglophone countries in the region was pronounced as ECOMOG forces found themselves fighting alongside government troops. Therefore, the West African ASF Brigade should work to ensure all states are involved to maintain its legitimacy (Vines and Middleton 2008, 17).

#### ECOWAS Standby Force

Like all other African sub-regional economic organizations, ECOWAS has created a standby force, known as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in 2003. Also referred as ECOBRIG or WESTBRIG, the ESF is a brigade level military force supported by a police and civilian component. It was formalized and replaced the ECOMOG. As Wulf and Debiel state, "ECOMOG is the core of the newly formed West African brigade, intended to be able to deploy 5,000 soldiers and civilians within 90 days as well as 1,500 within 30 days" (Wulf and Debiel 2009, 16). The ESF is meant to be a permanent and pre-dispositioned force ready for deployment in case of any crisis.

In 2005, a team of ECOWAS Development Partners (AU, EU, USA, UK, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and Netherlands), the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), together with the ECOWAS Mission Planning Management Cell (MPMC), met and provided an overarching framework document for the operationalization of the ESF. The ECOWAS Operational Framework phased the process by first of all

establishing a Task Force (TF) of 2773, which has been certified in 2009, and the remaining 3727 of the force to complement a brigade of 6500 to be ready by 2010. The ESFTF was structured into two infantry battalions (Western and Eastern) and a composite logistics battalion. The Western Battalion was led by Senegal, and the Eastern Battalion was led by Nigeria. The ESFTF was designed to mobilize quickly and deploy rapidly, and then can be expanded and enhanced into a fully functional main force. The capacity building support of the ESF is done through three training Centers of Excellence in the region, the National Defense College of Nigeria for the strategic level, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) (in Ghana) for the operational level, and the *Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye* (in Mali) for the tactical level. A formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been signed in this regard between ECOWAS and these three Training Centres of Excellence in Abuja on 11 April 2007, for an indefinite period (African Peace and Security Department 2010, 43-44).






Figure 4. ECOWAS Standby Force Task Force

Source: Afrique Defense, “Organizational Chart: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” *The Standby Force of ECOWAS May Intervene in Mali Blogger*, April 27, 2012, accessed 30 October 2016, <http://afrique-defense.blogspot.com/2012/04/la-force-en-attente-de-la-cedeao.html>.

ECOWAS has already proved in the past its capacity to undertake positive actions in conflict prevention, peacemaking, and conflict management in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. However, in the 2010s crises, ECOWAS seemed more successful in its conflict prevention missions in Guinea Bissau than in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire.

ECOWAS’s collective security encountered many challenges. The region was lacking of a proper airlift capability, and there was a need of increased interoperability

between the different battalions of different backgrounds in terms of both doctrine and material (African Peace and Security Department 2010, 45).

Moreover, the issue relating to the respect of states' sovereignty still delays the rapid political decision of interventions. ECOWAS used to act cautiously when security and peace issues within member states up until it broke out in conflict. As Hailu states, as part of the African Union, ECOWAS's main problem in its approach to collective security resides in its enduring doctrine of non-interference to resolve intra-state conflicts (Hailu 2012, 59). In addition, the lack of political will within countries is another ECOWAS challenge to maintain peace. With the adoption of the conflict prevention framework (ECPF), the challenge for ECOWAS and the region is no longer the absence of a strategy for engaging in comprehensive conflict prevention, but the political will to apply and implement the framework (Ekiyor 2008, 12). Nevertheless, these challenges are somewhat alleviated with the support of different partners.

#### ECOWAS Supporting Partners

Different partners support ECOWAS in implementing collective security. They are both state and non-state actors. The first partners are ECOWAS member states. Their support does not only reside in their financial or personnel contribution, but in their ability to settle peace or defend their respective countries by using force. States can participate in collective security individually by using force to defend from aggression as stipulated in UN Charter Article 51 (Tsagourias and White 2013, 64). Realizing that Western donors have generally supported military interventions financially, and the ECOWAS has always had difficulty in paying for such interventions, the ECOWAS created the Peace Fund (EPF) to pay for the timely financial requirements of maintaining

peace and security (IRIN 2003). The fund benefited also from different partners and donors, namely the African Development Bank (ADB), African Peace Facility (APF), European Union, Canada, Italy, Greece, China, and Japan. However, the EPF was planned to be resourced by 0.5 percent of the ECOWAS annual budget (African Peace and Security Department 2010, 45).

West Africa, like others sub-regions in the continent, has benefited from partners' support to implement collective security. The U.S. and Western partners have run various programs. However, the procedures used in implementing that support was appreciated differently. The new trend of that support is based on the avoidance of Western countries to commit forces in order to solve African conflicts and crises. As Hailu said, most of the Western powers have repeatedly expressed the view that they will not commit their armed forces to resolve African conflicts. Instead, they are willing to provide logistical, financial, training, diplomatic, and political support. It is in this respect, the U.S. proposed the creation of the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) in 1996.

The ACRF was to consist of a force of 5,000 to 10,000 troops made up by African countries, trained, and supported logistically by the U.S. and other donors. The force was planned to be composed of eight battalions (Hailu 2007, 44). Criticism of the concept was raised about the creation of that force, as the U.S. seemed to be the sole decision maker. For this reason, a new initiative under President Clinton, known as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), appeared with a large consultation of African countries. Its aim was to provide training to several African countries in order to develop a future capacity for peacekeeping at a national level. Early in the George W. Bush Administration, ACRI was transformed into the Africa Contingency Operations Training

and Assistance (ACOTA) program. This program focused on training provided to troops before deployment in peacekeeping operations. In addition, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), created in 2008, is an organization supporting African collective security. Hailu recommends more of a partnership with regional and sub-regional organizations with AFRICOM on conflict resolution (Hailu 2007, 45-46). In this respect, major multinational military exercises, such as FLINTLOCK, are conducted in Africa.

The European Union also supports the different components of the ASF within the context of the common Africa-EU strategy created in 2007. It allocated financial support to facilitate peace with over 250 million euro in 2007. It has also contributed in funding the French program, *Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP) and the ASF training program called AMANI. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations also supports the ASF by providing the force with specific recommendations in peacekeeping (Center for Security Studies ETH Zürich 2010, 3). According to the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), international organizations and the donor communities have a tendency to help sub-regional bodies like ECOWAS rather than individual countries to boost their capabilities to in order to tackle the myriad of conflict situations afflicting the African continent. The RECAMP program aims at anticipating solutions for potential crises by helping ECOWAS. According to Colonel Philippe Beny, RECAMP project officer, in 2004, the program was working in collaboration with other supporting instruments. At the closing of RECAMP, he states:

ECOWAS should have a Rapid Reaction Force for quick deployment into crises. It is the way forward. It is always better to intervene early. We are all together in this exercise. Officers from France, Britain, and the US are all part of

the Joint Staff to help ECOWAS channel its military capabilities in the same direction and with similar goals. (IRIN 2004)

Despite this, ECOWAS has a great will to support the operationalization of the ESF; it still counts on strategic partners. The latter provide technical expertise relating to planning and training, but also participate in funding. Other actors such as CSOs also participate in collective security.

### The ECPF and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Approaching the role of CSOs within the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework (ECPF), Thelma Ekiyor thinks that the contribution of civil society or non-state actors is largely valued, especially in conflict prevention. She claims that civil society has increasingly been at the center of significant processes to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts. Their strength resides in their capability of mediation and reconciliation, and defense of human rights. This is particularly enabled by their closeness to the different communities in peacetime. This appreciation is the reason why the African Union and sub-regional organizations tend to institutionalize them. The West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) is the major organization contributing in various peace policies ranging from democratic governance to regional peace. Other organizations exist such as the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), the Foundation for Security and Development of Africa (FOSDA), and the West Africa Women's Association (WAWA). They all work with ECOWAS on issues of governance, early warning, small arms proliferation, and gender respectively. For example, the West African Network on Small Arms (WANSAN) and the West African Network on Peacebuilding are both very

instrumental in advocating for better peacebuilding measures. To succeed in this collaboration, ECOWAS should consider different things. The first one is to work with all CSOs, which have expertise in peace building and peacekeeping. The second is to evaluate the expertise of those organizations, and the last is to bring together policy makers, especially parliamentarians, close to those CSOs (Ekiyor 2008, 10-11).

This collaboration is possible because the ECOWAS peace framework, signed in 2008, encourages the involvement of CSOs in the process of the quest for security.

Paragraph 114a-b-c of ECPF states:

Member States and civil society within them shall bear the principal responsibility for peace and security. To this end, civil society organizations and the private sector shall constitute valued and bona fide partners at the regional (ECOWAS), national (Member State) and local (community) levels in the implementation and evaluation of the ECPF and in cooperation arrangements with external partners. ECOWAS shall facilitate [i] the periodic evaluation of the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) and other partner civil society networks in the region with a view to strengthening internal democracy, inclusiveness, programming and oversight; [ii] the establishment of a mechanism similar to the UN ECOSOC with modalities for Memorandums of Understanding and different levels of accreditation to serve as an interface with civil society networks; [iii] Information sharing with civil society networks and setting up of communication channels for civil society inputs into ECOWAS policies and programs. Civil society organizations shall [i] contribute to the conceptualization, development, implementation and monitoring of ECOWAS policies and programs on peace and security; [ii] mobilize and channel civil society concerns and findings into ECOWAS initiatives; [iii] lead advocacy in Member States through awareness raising, lobbying and campaigns around ECOWAS resources, including the Community Court and Parliament, policies and interventions; [iv] spearhead conflict prevention and peace-building activities in Member States, especially at the national policy and community levels; [v] provide, alongside the private sector, technical and financial support for the implementation of activities within the ECPF. (ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 2008, 56-7)

However, according to Juan Daniel Reyes, there are some shortcomings in the communication between the civil society organizations and sub-regional or regional

organizations. This distance in communication can affect the full participation of civil society organizations in the peace process. He thinks:

The problem of communication is indicative of the chasm that exists between governmental and non-governmental actors in the continent. Indirect participation of NGOs in the institutional development of the CEWS will most probably result in the absence of direct channels of participation for this type of organizations in the operationalization of the system as such. (Reyes 2007, 155)

From this review, it comes relevant information, which highlights a number of variables to consider in chapters 3 and 4. The main principles of collective security emphasize the variables of political will and military readiness. Within those variables, important points can be underlined as sub-variables, such as the commitment of organization member states, external support, preventive actions, adaptable military training to threats, and deployment capabilities.

### Summary

Chapter 2 provides a literature review on the concept of collective security. Throughout the chapter, different authors revisit the evolution of the concept and make some necessary recommendations in order to acquire and maintain collective security. Specifically, in West Africa, even if the different viewpoints recognize the existence of solid collective security mechanisms including the ESF and the ECPF, supported by many partners, some challenges related to country members' sovereignty and individual political will remain a reality. Chapter 3 will deal with the methodology used to analyze collective security in West Africa with a view toward making policy recommendations on how to make it more effective.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

The research of this thesis aims at finding relevant proposals to support an optimal level of collective security within ECOWAS country members. It mainly focuses on collecting data about the ECOWAS mechanism to ensure security from various sources (primary and secondary), and then analyze them. The primary data are collected from documents, especially reports and protocols from the ECOWAS, AU, and the UN about the ECOWAS collective security framework and its relations with different partners. Secondary data are collected from books (some specifically addressing West Africa regional security issues), journals, internet sources, and research from the Combined Arms Research Library, the KAIPTC, Ghana, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, and the Center for Security Studies (CSS), Zürich. Various theses related to collective security from the U.S. Army Command and Staff College and U.S. Army War College are also consulted. These documents focus on the challenges and strengths of the ECOWAS collective security systems, and suggest important recommendations. The collection of information will not involve any direct engagement from outside providers.

#### Qualitative Methodology

This research will be conducted using a qualitative methodology based on case studies. As a major research methodology in social sciences, qualitative research begins with assumptions, a worldview, and the possible use of theoretical lenses, and the study of research problems. A qualitative methodology is used because a problem needs to be



explored, and the researcher analyzes data using multiple levels of abstraction (Creswell 2007, 39-46). The methodology is more suitable as it allows an in depth understanding of the hindrances ECOWAS likely faces when similar crises occur, as will be described in the following study. When defining this research methodology, Denzin and Lincoln insist on the process of the method. They state:

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretative, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 3)

The purpose and focus of qualitative research is to understand the meaning people have constructed; that is, how people make sense of their world, and the experiences they have in the world (Merriam 2009, 13). A simpler and more functional definition explains that qualitative research is any research that uses data that do not indicate ordinal values (Nki and Ryan 2001, 1). The criterion of this definition is based on the type of data gathered or used. One of the differences between qualitative and quantitative research is, while quantitative researchers tend to be interested in whether and to what extent variance in one case causes variance in another case, qualitative researchers tend to ask how  $x$  plays a role in causing  $y$ , what the process is that connects  $x$  and  $y$  (Maxwell 2013, 31).

In regard of the above explanation, using a qualitative research methodology will enable an analysis of ECOWAS political and military responses to crises. Such an analysis will show where ECOWAS often encounters obstacles, either in the decision

making and political will of state members or in the operationalization of the forces, namely the ESF. The identification of the most common issues will lead to develop appropriate recommendations the organization can use in preventive or intervention steps. To arrive at different conclusions, some key variables, all of them relating to the political and military effectiveness of the organization, will be analyzed. These variables can turn around the political commitment of member states, civil society organizations, supporting partners, and the readiness of the force.

The study will be based on the observation and analysis of three cases: Côte d'Ivoire 2010, Mali 2012, and Guinea Bissau 2012. The selection of these cases will help to find how ECOWAS' actions within these cases are similar or different. According to Bromley, a case study is a "systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events that aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest" (Bromley 1990, 302). The unit of analysis can vary from an individual to a corporation. While there is a utility in applying this method retrospectively, it is most often used prospectively. Data come largely from documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation and physical artifacts. A case study approach can help to understand the behavior of ECOWAS when facing crises in the above-mentioned countries. As Donna M. Zucker, in referring to R. K. Yin (1994) states, it is the preferred strategy when "how" and "why" questions are posed (Zucker 2009, 4). Based upon the purpose of the inquiry, different types of case studies exist. An instrumental case study is used to provide insight into an issue; an intrinsic case study is undertaken to gain a deeper understanding of the case; and the collective case study is the study of a number of cases in order to inquire into a particular phenomenon (Stake 1995). In summary, the purposes of case study

research may be exploratory, descriptive, interpretive, and explanatory (Mariano 1993, 311).

There is a certain logic following that selection. The crises in all those cases happened between 2010 and 2012. The first two countries were former French colonies; the last one was a Portuguese colony. This means that foreign implications will be different. In addition, the appreciation of the level of success may not be the same. ECOWAS reacted rapidly and contained the crisis in Guinea Bissau, yet its decision was delayed in the case of Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, thus acting as a second order element as France already took the initiative. Finally, the characteristics of threats within those countries are different. Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau were facing an internal security issue due to political unrest. In Mali, a mix of political and terrorism aspects caused internal security issues. All three cases have similar and different characteristics.

The research will follow William Wiersma's five steps for conducting research. First is the identification and isolation of the problem. Second is to review the information relevant to the thesis, namely developed in chapter 2 in order to determine critical factors for an optimal collective security. Third is the collection and classification of data concerning the case studies. Fourth is to analyze the data to determine what needs to be improved. Fifth is to draw conclusions in order to make recommendations (Wiersma 1991, 8).

#### Step 1. Identification and Isolation of the Problem.

Throughout the review in chapter 1 and 2, it is obvious that ECOWAS has a long tradition in crises resolutions around West Africa. Since 1990, ECOWAS has experienced mediation and peacekeeping operations successfully. Some of them took

place in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. The adoption of APSA in 2002, resulting in the creation of the African Standby Force, in which the ECOWAS Standby Force participates, would be affected to increase the dynamism of the sub-regional organization in implementing collective security. However, the reaction of the African Union, and specifically ECOWAS, cannot be considered completely successful during the series of crises, which occurred in Côte d'Ivoire (2010), Guinea Bissau (2012), and Mali (2012). In Côte d'Ivoire and Mali, AU and ECOWAS intervened late, sometimes leaving a third party taking the lead. In both cases, the consequences were disastrous in the social, economic, political and cultural domains. This study aims at determining the reasons for ECOWAS's shortcomings, both politically and militarily, during these crises.

## Step 2. Review of Relevant Information

In reviewing relevant information contained in chapter 2, it is clear that, ECOWAS works in relation with the African Union to operationalize a collective security mechanism. The integration of the ESF in the ASF within the APSA framework should normally facilitate its action. Moreover, the support of private and governmental strategic partners, and the involvement of civil society organizations, is significant to ECOWAS's action. To line up with collective security principles, ECOWAS should primarily rely on two key factors: political will and military readiness. The political will includes the commitment of member states so that a common decision will be taken in case of crises. It also takes into account their financial contribution to the system without any particular interest that can delay an intervention. It also concerns their willingness to contribute troops whenever necessary and the states' willingness to operate with civil society organizations. In this respect, some sub-regional hegemons, like Nigeria, should be

committed in regard of their influence. As for the military will, it mainly concerns the operational status of troops. It will insist on their capability of rapid deployment, requiring significant logistical means, and their training to cope with the ever-evolving terrorist threat.

### Step 3. Collection and Classification of Data

This study used two steps to collect information in order to answer the research question. First, it reviewed relevant literature about collective security, generally worldwide, and specifically in Africa, and West Africa. The focus is on the AU's, and mostly ECOWAS' current collective security framework and approach. The second step is based on gathering and analyzing information provided by individual and organizations' studies and assessment of the ECOWAS approach. Studies provided by organizations come principally from the African Union Peace and Security Department Assessment 2010, the ISS, Pretoria, the CSS ETH Zürich, and the Kofi Annan Center. Individual studies come from official and expert reports. All this information gives a deep understanding of the PSC and ECOWAS structural organizations and challenges. Finding these challenges will enable the development of recommendations.

### Step 4. Data Analysis

This analysis will focus on how ECOWAS' response to crises, in consideration of the supporting partners' actions, supports the sub-regional collective security, and its longer-term sustainable capabilities. This will allow at the end to detect the main challenges of the organization.

The analysis will look into the preventive and the reactive actions within the political and military domains in Côte d'Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2012), and Mali (2012) cases. As modeled in the following table, five variables will be assessed as “met,” “somewhat met,” or “not met.” First, early warning concerns all actions taken by ECOWAS or any other integrated organizations to alert about a developing crisis. This variable will be “met” if it existed and provided timely information to ECOWAS in order to take action. It is “somewhat met” if it existed, but could not provide timely information to ECOWAS. It is “not met” when it did not exist. Second, diplomatic actions deal with the existence and effectiveness of any mediation to solve crises. This variable is “met” if it existed and allowed ECOWAS to solve the crisis. It is “somewhat met” if it existed, but was unable to solve the crisis, and “not met” when any mediation was undertaken. Third, strong military coalition deals with ECOWAS ability to mobilize the necessary military force for an intervention. This condition “is met” if ECOWAS succeeded to convince and mobilize necessary forces from its members, particularly those who had more capabilities (equipment and troop). It is “somewhat met” if some countries did not support that option, but it did not prevent ECOWAS to deploy and fulfill its mission, and “not met” if the decision is rejected by majority or some members, resulting in a delay or non-deployment. Fourth, support of other nations and communities deals with the impacts of any diplomatic position, financial support from a different actor than ECOWAS. This variable is “met” if ECOWAS’ actions are fully supported. It will be “somewhat met,” if that support is challenged by other communities or countries’ position. It is “not met” if there is no support from the outside. Fifth, implication of civil society organizations concerns the integration of such organizations in order to manage a crisis. This variable

will be “met” if such organizations were fully integrated within the efforts of ECOWAS. It is “somewhat met” if ECOWAS integrated them, but the conditions are not favorable for them to take enough action. It is “not met” when they are excluded by ECOWAS.

Table 3. Assessment of ECOWAS Response to Crisis				
Variables		Crises		
		Côte d’Ivoire 2010	Guinea Bissau 2012	Mali 2012
<b>ECOWAS Political and Military Commitment</b>	Early Warning			
	Diplomatic Actions			
	Strong Military Coalition			
<b>Supporting Partners</b>	Support of other Nations and Communities			
	Implication of Civil Society Organizations			

*Source:* Created by author

### Step 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The conclusions found after assessing ECOWAS’s response to these crises will indicate which sub-variable ECOWAS did not meet in each crisis. This will lead to a proposal of what needs to be done in the military and the political sides to help ECOWAS develop an optimal collective security approach.

### Arrangement of Chapters

This study is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 sets the common background of collective security mechanisms with an opening to the African context especially in West Africa. Chapter 2 reviewed the relevant literature on collective security mechanisms and principles with a focus of the African Union’s PSC and the ECOWAS collective

security framework. Chapter 3 outlined the qualitative methodology used based on three case studies. Chapter 4 will deal with the analysis of the ECOWAS response to the above-mentioned crises by looking into the political and military variables. Finally, chapter 5 will make recommendations based on the analysis of the case studies, which will be the basis for addressing ECOWAS' challenges to meet collective security.

### Summary

The qualitative methodology used in this study is based on three cases studies. It aims at assessing ECOWAS's ability to meet collective security principles. It will examine its response to crises based on five variables relating to military and political domains. The following chapter will proceed by analyzing each case and interpret the results. At the end, a general evaluation of all cases will permit to know in which variables ECOWAS encounters some challenges. The results of the analysis will help to make appropriate recommendations for more effectiveness.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

When ECOWAS was created in 1975, its objective was to develop an economic integration of West African states in order to attain sustainable development. However, a series of intra-states crises in the 1990s affected the political, social, and economic domains of the state-members and started compromising ECOWAS's objectives. This situation caused ECOWAS to become more flexible, adapting itself to crisis resolution. The first experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone seemed more or less successful. ECOWAS then began to develop and integrate peace and security mechanisms. With the adoption of the AU in 2002, the establishment of the APSA and the PSC, ECOWAS was supposed to be more effective. In fact, since the ESF had to integrate the ASF, AU would back ECOWAS politically when it came to being called on to perform military intervention. Moreover, the ESF would benefit from military support of the ASF. These advantages would allow ECOWAS to be more responsive. However, this was not always the case. In crises that broke out in West Africa from 2010 to 2012, ECOWAS did not perform well overall. Using three cases and by looking at the political will and military readiness, this study will analyze why ECOWAS is more successful in some cases than others. This approach will lead to finding some recommendations, which can optimize ECOWAS's effort to achieve collective security.

Chapter 1 and 2 introduced the background of Africa, and especially West Africa's peace and security issues, and reviewed literature on their collective security mechanisms. They include an observation of the keys organs with the APSA, such as the

PSC, the MSC, the ASF, the ESF, and their funding sources. Chapter 3 explained the qualitative methodology used in this study which will focus on three cases studies. This chapter will analyze those three cases to determine what prevented ECOWAS from meeting the standard of a timely and effective response to crises. In each case, it will evaluate the political and the military parameters based on different sub-variables. It will end with a partial interpretation of the results. An overall conclusion will be drawn at the completion of all case studies. The three cases are Côte d'Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2012), and Mali (2012).

### Case Study 1: Côte d'Ivoire 2010

#### Crisis Background

Côte d'Ivoire used to be one of the most stable countries in West Africa. From independence to the death of its first president, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the country had succeeded in maintaining an appreciable economic position, thus attracting many foreigners, most of them coming from neighboring countries. However, that stability was tainted by social tensions. Most of the northern Ivoirians, who resided in the south, faced increasing resistance from southerners because they were considered immigrant workers. That perception prevented them from fully participating in civic life. The death of Houphouët-Boigny in late 1993 generated rivalries over political power and leadership succession rights. His successor, Henri Konan Bédié, used these social divisions to rally political support, making use of a xenophobic, nationalist ideology known as *Ivoirité*. It defined southerners as “authentic” Ivoirians, in opposition to “circumstantial” ones, that is, northerners and immigrants. In 1995, Henry Konan Bedie made an amendment to the electoral code, which introduced the principle of *Ivoirité*. That principle denied any

candidate, not born from two Ivoirian parents, to run for the presidency. It raised criticisms from many people, who considered it as a political calculation aimed to set aside Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who was rumored to be born of a father from Burkina Faso. Indeed, Ouattara was a former Prime Minister under Boigny, leader of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) party, and had solid ties with the northern population of Côte d'Ivoire. This stage was really the starting point of Côte d'Ivoire's political turmoil. In 1999, General Guei rose to power after a coup against Bedie, and wanted to continue to remain in power in the 2000 election. After a controversial referendum that still maintained the principle of *Ivoirite* to keep Ouattara out of the electoral competition, Guei would not concede his defeat to Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI). Consequently, the population ousted him, and Gbagbo took office (Cook 2011, 16). However, to some Ivoirians, the election of Gbagbo was not legitimate as the *Ivoirité* issue had been applied, preventing Ouattara from being a candidate.

On 19 September 2002, the *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI) launched a rebellion to overthrow Gbagbo's government. Upon its failure, they retreated to the north of Cote d'Ivoire. They were later joined by two other rebel groups composed of the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MJP) and the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO). Together, they formed the *Forces Nouvelles (FN)* under the leadership of Guillaume Soro. The opposition posed by the FN created a civil war that divided Cote d'Ivoire. Gbagbo government controlled the northern part of the country, while the southern part of the country aligned with the FN (Balint-Kurti 2007, 4, 16).

France intervened to protect its citizens, and ultimately stopped the advance of the northern rebels to the south by establishing a buffer zone. On 26 October 2002, after a

long mediation, ECOWAS decided to deploy a mission known as the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) to monitor the cease-fire. In 2003, the UNSC Resolution 1464 broadened the tasks of that mission, assigning it to ensure that the ceasefire was respected and population protected (IRIN 2008). In March 2004, with the adoption of the UNSCR 1528, ECOMICI joined the newly created United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) (UN 2004).

Following the Ouagadougou political agreements in 2007, a presidential election was organized in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 under the supervision of the international community. After a delay that exceeded the normal three-day period for announcing election results, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared Ouattara as the winner with 54 percent of the votes. The Gbagbo camp considered this declaration illegal since it had exceeded the required time limit, and the commission, itself, was still divided on issues, pertaining to voting discrepancies in the northern regions. As a result, Gbagbo seized the Constitutional Council, which declared him the winner in the elections with 51 percent of the votes, after cancelling many of the votes from the north that were considered invalid. That decision hinged upon the nullification of roughly 600,000 votes in the pro-Ouattara regions in the center and north (Yabi 2012, 2).

Nevertheless, the UN, ECOWAS, and many other organizations endorsed the results given by the IECmz, declaring victory for Ouattara. A new crisis began, leading to the confrontation between the Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), loyal to Gbagbo, and the combatants of the *Forces Nouvelles*, coming mostly from the north and supporting Ouattara. Ultimately, the *Forces Nouvelles*, backed by the French Operation Licorne, captured Gbagbo , on 11 April 2011 (Cook 2011).

## ECOWAS Political and Military Commitment

### Early Warning

Concerning this variable, ECOWAS, as well as the UN and AU, were aware of a probable outburst from the crisis. Since the 2002 civil war, ECOWAS's mission was present and was already integrated into the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Understanding the fragile state of peace within the country and its neighbors, Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS was one of the actors that sought to set conditions for a peaceful transition by organizing transparent elections. In this respect, negotiations supported by the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and France led to the agreements of Lomé (2002), Linas Marcoussis, France (2003), Accra (2004), Pretoria (2005), and ultimately Ouagadougou (2007). They recommended the creation of an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) with a representation of all the political parties. The Independent Electoral Commission was charged to organize the elections, and publish the provisory results before transmitting them to the Constitutional Council for final publication. Only at that moment, could the UN certify the result of the elections (Ivoire Verite 2010, 2-4). The UN, AU, and ECOWAS knew what was going on in Côte d'Ivoire, and updated information about the situation. Therefore, this sub-variable is "met."

### Diplomatic Actions

The commitment of ECOWAS countries in the diplomatic actions variable will be analyzed within the context of AU, as they frequently worked in a unified effort. ECOWAS member states recognized, early on, the results given by the IEC, and started putting pressure on Gbagbo. On 7 December 2010, the organization invited Gbagbo to immediately yield power, and suspended Côte d'Ivoire's participation in the organization

“until further notice.” On 9 December, the AU Commission (AUC) Peace and Security Council (PSC) endorsed that decision (Cook 2011, 30).

The AU and ECOWAS each held several high-level meetings to address the crisis, and dispatched multiple diplomatic delegations to Côte d’Ivoire to diffuse tensions and convince Gbagbo to respect the results of the election. On December 4, Gbagbo and Ouattara both inaugurated themselves. The AU deployed former South African President Thabo Mbeki to mediate a peaceful outcome. On 18 December 2010, the AU Commission chairperson, AU PSC chair, and ECOWAS Commission president met with Gbagbo to reiterate their positions, and offered to resettle him outside Côte d’Ivoire. On 28 December 2010, ECOWAS dispatched a delegation of three heads of state, made up of the presidents from Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, and Benin, to deliver an ultimatum to Gbagbo, demanding him to step down before ECOWAS resorted to the use of force. Following their failure to convince Gbagbo, the AU designated mediator, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, and the ECOWAS president joined the same delegation on 3 January 2011, but with no result. In fact, the choice of Odinga was not appropriate because of his post-electoral claims against his rival in 2007 led his country to a bad situation. He had also previously taken a forceful line, qualifying the Gbagbo electoral claim to be a “violation of democracy,” and called for the AU to “develop teeth” instead of “sitting and lamenting all the time.” He went back for negotiating talks between the two electoral rivals on January 17, but this time the Ouattara camp rejected his proposal unless Gbagbo ceded power. Ultimately, the AU PSC appointed a high-level panel made up of the presidents of South Africa, Chad, Mauritania, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Chad, along with AU Chairperson Jean Ping and ECOWAS Commission president by

late January 2011. The panel deployed to Abidjan to consult with the opposed parties on 21 February 2011, the same day on which at least six persons were reported killed in a state security force raid. One panel member, the Burkina Faso President, did not make the trip due a threat of attack on his person by the Young Patriots close to Gbagbo, who viewed him as partial toward Ouattara (Cook 2011, 33-34; Olivier 2016). Therefore, ECOWAS and the AU showed a willingness to resolve the crisis diplomatically, but it was not effective. Even though ECOWAS and the AU reacted, proposing diplomatic and military power, their early leaning to the use of force was not positively appreciated by some African countries. Besides, some mediators, such as Raila Odinga, seemed inappropriate to bring a consensus in Côte d'Ivoire, as he had already led his country into political turmoil in 2007. Therefore, it was important to choose the right person in diplomacy. As there were some flaws within that mediation, this sub-variable is valued as "somewhat met."

### Strong Military Coalition

When the last mediation mission was sent to Côte d'Ivoire, it was reported that 6,500 soldiers of the ESF were preparing to intervene, and a logistics meeting was held in mid-January 2011 in Mali to finalize when troops would be deployed and how long they could remain in the country. When ECOWAS decided for military intervention, Ghana declined to participate, citing an overburden of international peacekeeping deployments in other regions, a preference for quiet diplomacy, and the presence of an estimated 600,000 or so Ghanaians in Côte d'Ivoire (Cook 2011, 39; Aning and Atuobi 2011, 3). Another problem was that not all members held the same positions about the credibility of the elections and did not support the use of force. Among those states were Gambia,

Uganda, Angola, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, and even South Africa. Gambia recognized the legality of Gbagbo's election and was opposed to a possible ECOWAS military intervention. Uganda's President Museveni called for an investigation of the poll process, which led to the rejection of the validity of international recognition of Ouattara and denial of Gbagbo's claimed victory. Angola supported a negotiated end to the crisis and not regional military intervention (Cook 2011, 33).

In addition, it is important to notice that at that time, Nigeria, the sub-regional hegemon, was having domestic security concerns that precluded it from contributing forces. Within the African context, South Africa was skeptical about a military intervention. It preferred to continue on negotiations and investigate Gbagbo's claim. A suspicion existed that an intervention by the region's emerging standby force was not operationally feasible because of limited personnel and logistical capacities (Yabi 2012, 4). This situation may explain why ECOWAS did not finally deploy a force until a war broke out between the opposing parties. As there was a division of ECOWAS member states, which prevented ESF to intervene, this sub-variable is assessed as "not met."

### Supporting Partners

#### Support of Other Nations and Communities

The UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Côte d'Ivoire, Choi Young-Jin, certified the runoff results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (UNOCI 2010). The UN, European Union, AU, and the United States endorsed the IEC-announced poll results as legitimate, and demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency to Ouattara. They used diplomatic and financial sanctions, to put pressure on Gbagbo. On 29 October 2010, in accordance with the UNSCR 1946, the EU



renewed an arms embargo on Côte d'Ivoire, targeted financial assets, restricted some pro-Gbagbo officials from travel, and placed a ban on the import of rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire. Ultimately, the main conflict died down days after Gbagbo's arrest by pro-Ouattara forces, supported by UN and French peacekeepers. It is reported they used small mounted artillery, helicopter gunships, and armored vehicles to attack the compound in a bid to neutralize heavy weapons reportedly being used by Gbagbo's forces. Russia and China reportedly expressed reservations about UNOCI's election certification, and slowed the UN Security Council's decision-making in response to the post-electoral crisis. They questioned the impartiality of the UN in Côte d'Ivoire, and thinking it had exceeded its limits in regard of their implications as they took sides with Ouattara's camp before the Constitutional Council gave its last word (Cook 2011, 2). From this narrative, diplomatic support existed from partners and other communities, even if Russia and China did not have the same position on the actions of the UN and other countries. Overall, this sub-variable is assessed as "met."

#### Implication of Civil Society Organizations

The civil society organizations and religious groups played an important role in preparing the opposing parties before the elections. Under the structure of the Ivoirian Civil Society Convention (ICSC), they organized some sessions for a national consensus in May 2009. They also deployed some observers during the two rounds of the elections. They recorded some irregularities at the second round of the election, principally in the north, even if the Francophonie International Organization (FIO) mentioned in their report that those shortcomings did not affect the elections. The Religious Collective for Appeased Elections also sensitized the different Christian, Muslim, and Evangelist

communities. The NGO, *Reporters Sans Frontieres*, took steps to monitor the messages with different media. However, the NGO did not appreciate the tone of the private media in between the first and second rounds, as it conveyed messages of hatred of certain political leaders, and they reported the northern region was not sufficiently secure to allow correct performance of its job during the runoff (OIF 2010, 17-20). Since civil society organizations were present and performing their missions, their involvement is assessed as “met.”

### Case Study 2: Guinea-Bissau 2012

#### Crisis Background

Since its independence in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has never been a stable country caused mainly by military interferences in politics that resulted in different coups. ECOWAS first intervened in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 to end a civil war, derived from a struggle for power between President Joao “Nino” Vieira and his Armed Forces Chief, Ansumane Mane (Obi 2009, 126).

On 2 March 2009, during his second term, President Vieira was assassinated by a group of soldiers reported to avenge the death of the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Batista Tagme Na Wai, who had been killed in an explosion the day before. A new presidential election, held in June 2009, resulted in the election of President Malam Bacai Sanhá. When taking office, Sanhá pledged to work on security sector reform and fight drug trafficking. He appointed General José Zamora Induta as Chief of the Armed Forces (Yabi 2010, 28-29). However, on 1 April 2010, the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces, Antonio Indjai led a mutiny, captured the new chief of the armed forces as well as Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr before releasing them a day later. The same day, mutineers

freed the detained former navy commander, Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, who had been involved in the 2008 coup attempt, and Indjai proclaimed himself Chief of the Armed Forces. Finally, President Sanhá, who declared first that the government remain in civilian hands, officially appointed Indjai as Chief of the Armed Forces and Na Tchuto as Chief of the Navy. That decision drew condemnation from the international community, and reflected the persistent influence of the military and a severe weakening of civilian control over the government (Freedom House 2011; Mindzie 2012)

Following the death of President Sanhá on 9 January 2012, the country experienced political instability once again. A presidential election was organized, and after the first round, some members of the armed forces staged a coup on 12 April 2012. The army justified the coup by acting against an alleged secret deal between the Prime Minister and the Angolan military technical mission (MISSANG), to “annihilate Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces.” In fact, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes was becoming increasingly unpopular due to his efforts to downsize an undisciplined army, and strongly relying on a 200-man contingent of Angolan troops as a presidential guard. These troops were sent on 11 March 2011 to support a security sector reform program. They were also mandated to strengthen the police in order to fight the cocaine trafficking business, in which some senior officials and politicians were apparently involved. The Angolan troops had been a concern to many army chiefs, as they were seen to side with the Prime Minister, acting as his private security force. There were also rumors at the end of March 2012 about the entry of heavy weapons sent by Angola to reinforce the Angolan troops, and Guinea-

Bissau's military heads were not in good term with the Angolan ambassador (IRIN 2012).

During this coup, former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr, candidate for the presidential election, and the appointed interim President, Raimundo Pereira, were captured and detained by the junta. They were released on 27 April 2012 after a delegation of ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense Staff was dispatched to Bissau to discuss with the military junta about the implementation of the ECOWAS decisions to send troops (United Nations Security Council 2012, 7). The military formed a Military Command under the leadership of the army's vice chief of staff, General Mamadu Toure Kuruma, and put forth conditions for a national unity government. They met the leaders of the political parties, except the African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) party, and called on them to form the transitional government. However, they said the army would control the defense and interior ministries. After many meetings, the coalition of political parties agreed upon a set of proposals that would put forward the Military Command for a transitional unity government, but the PAIGC rejected that proposal. The National Union of Workers of Guinea Bissau called a general strike the next day. On 16 April 2012, an agreement, which deliberately excluded PAIGC, was reached with twenty-two of the thirty-five opposition parties to set up the National Transition Council. The existing institutions were to be dissolved, and in their place, two committees would run the country. One would manage foreign affairs and the other would handle social affairs. Thereafter, it was agreed that the transitional government would rule for two years before new elections would be held. The National Assembly Speaker, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo was designated as an interim president on

11 May 2012. ECOWAS formally condemned the coup in Guinea Bissau and the existing arrangement (Okeke et al. 2014, 7-8).

## ECOWAS Political and Military Commitment

### Early Warning

Following the series of crises starting from 2009, ECOWAS understood that Guinea-Bissau was unstable. The 2012 presidential election was just the trigger. The joint ECOWAS, AU, Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), EU, and UN report confirmed this statement after their mission to Guinea-Bissau from 16 to 21 December 2012.

Many interlocutors of the joint mission pointed out that in March 2012, there were already warning signs on the horizon, and that the presidential election in Guinea-Bissau had only been the immediate trigger of the coup d'état, which was the continuation of a trend which saw no Head of State completing his term in office, since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1994. (African Union Peace and Security 2013)

The president of the ECOWAS Commission recognized the fragile security state of Guinea-Bissau in 2011, and reassured its citizens that ECOWAS would continue to monitor events in the country with a view to responding appropriately and firmly to any further attempts to bring instability. The reconsideration of the Defense and Security Sector Reform program (DSSR) in 2011 by the ECOWAS heads of states was a crucial factor of stability, which showed that ECOWAS was aware of the impending crises (ECOWAS 2011). Additionally, in May 2011, an assessment of USAID's Early Warning and Response Design Support (EWARDs), conducted jointly with the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), a component of the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), confirmed reports of deep divisions between and

among demographic groups. Those divisions were related to issues of land, natural resources management, cattle rustling, pension plans for ex-combatants, and the distribution of development resources. Social cleavages were also exacerbated by corruption, lawlessness drug trafficking, impunity, and governance failures. The assessment noted the absence of services and the state's incapacity especially in rural areas (USAID EWARDS 2011). One thing ECOWAS did not grasp or did not try to handle was the sentiment of rejection the Guinean's Armed Forces had towards the Angolan forces. Preventive actions would dictate ECOWAS to send soldiers to replace Angolan forces and secure the elections. The alert existed, but ECOWAS did not really exploit it. Therefore, this variable is assessed as "somewhat met."

#### Diplomatic Actions

During this crisis, ECOWAS undertook effective diplomatic efforts, along with AU, EU CPLP and UN. These efforts included the condemnation of the coup, establishment of conditions for a credible election, and the pursuit of peacebuilding. The inclusiveness and the character of the immediate cause of trouble (military) may explain the success of ECOWAS diplomacy in this crisis. ECOWAS solved the immediate problem, which was to remove the military in power, but for long-term solutions, it worked with other actors.

After condemning the coup, ECOWAS dispatched to Bissau a delegation, led by the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Mr. Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, on 16 April, to meet the "Military Command," the five presidential candidates, and a PAIGC delegation. The delegation called for the immediate restoration of constitutional order and the release of all detained officials (United Nations Security Council 2012, 2)

At the summit of Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire on April 26, ECOWAS denounced the attempt by the Military Command to organize a political arrangement through the formation of a National Transition Council. The regional leaders considered the arrangement unconstitutional, and vowed not to recognize it. ECOWAS authorities recalled its principle of “zero tolerance” for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means. ECOWAS formed a Seven-Nation Contact Group composed of Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Senegal, and Togo, chaired by Nigeria to follow up the decisions about Guinea Bissau. The Summit, thereafter, issued a 72-hour ultimatum to the junta to submit a mediation process for a consensual transition arrangement that would result in restoration of constitutional democracy, and authorized the deployment of the regional Standby Force to replace Angolan troops in Guinea Bissau. There was no opposition to that deployment because the military justified the coup by the presence of the Angolan troops. The first troops of 650 soldiers, primarily composed of Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal, arrived on 16 May 2012. ECOWAS decided also to impose diplomatic, economic, and financial sanctions on Guinea Bissau and members of the junta, and their associates (Okeke et al. 2014, 9; Mindzie 2012).

ECOWAS mediation continued after the deployment of the contingent in order to reestablish a credible power and prevent further trouble. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Guinea-Bissau and ECOWAS, on 7 November 2012, was an important step to formalize the ECOMIB mission and start the Defense and Security Sector Reform (DSSR). ECOWAS's mediation led to the reconfiguration of the Bureau of the People's National Assembly (ANP). On 22 May 2012, following consultations among the signatories of the Transition Pact during the visit to Bissau by an ECOWAS

ministerial-level delegation, a transitional government was set up. All parties, including those that signed the Transition Pact and the reticent parties, particularly the PAIGC, agreed upon the established institutions. It was agreed that the transition would not exceed twelve months, and would be concluded with the holding of credible presidential and legislative elections (African Union Peace and Security 2013; ECOWAS 2012). This variable is valued as “met.”

#### Strong Military Coalition

When the idea to deploy troops to Guinea-Bissau was raised, there was no opposition from ECOWAS members and the Guinean camp. The contingent mostly dealt with peacebuilding. Despite its limited number (650 soldiers primarily from Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, and Senegal), the contingent succeeded to fulfill its mission, including securing the presidential elections and assisting the DSSR. The strength of the contingent was appropriate to the scope of the problem. In a speech at the UN Security Council, Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), stated that he recognized “the valuable work done by ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) in securing the institutions and advance security sector reform in the country” (United Nations Security Council 2015). The contingent ended its mission on 30 June 2016. Therefore, this variable is assessed as “met.”



## Supporting Partners

### Support of other Nations and Communities

During this crisis, the international community supported ECOWAS in its action. They immediately condemned the coup, while the World Bank and the African Development Bank suspended millions of dollars of development programs in the country to increase pressure on the military leaders. The AU commission and UN Security Council worked in close cooperation with ECOWAS and all actors concerned to restore constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau (Mindzie 2012)

During a meeting in New York on 28 September 2012 to discuss the deployment of an international protection force and the misunderstanding regarding the mandate of the Angolan Military Assistance Mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG), representatives of the Guinean-Bissau authorities requested a joint mission of the ECOWAS, AU, CPLP, EU, and UN. The five organizations met in Addis Ababa on 1 December 2012, and agreed on the terms of reference for the mission and its modalities. The mission was dispatched to Guinea-Bissau from 16 to 21 December. They met with the current authorities, the Bureau of the People's National Assembly (ANP), the Bureau of the National Electoral Commission (CNE), political parties, civil society organizations, and the diplomatic community. Various problems were raised including impunity, human rights violations and repeated military interference in governance and involvement in drug trafficking (African Union Peace and Security 2013).

As for solutions, the mission and interlocutors agreed on pursuing the DSSR program to transform the revolutionary army that fought for independence, into a republican army. To succeed in this task, they insisted on sensitizing the politics about

any use of the army to achieve power. Understanding that Guinea-Bissau was a key transit zone for drugs from Latin America to Europe, and that the country did not have enough air and naval surveillance capabilities, particularly in most of its small islands, they proposed international support. A consensus was also reached on two points. The first focused on the need to deal with the structural problems, and the second was the necessity of inclusiveness in the structures of the transition of all parties (African Union Peace and Security 2013; IRIN 2012). These efforts put all the five major actors to work together and assist ECOWAS. This variable is assessed as “met.”

#### Implication of Civil Society Organizations

During this crisis, ECOWAS integrated the actions of civil society. Many of them denounced the coup. On 15 April, the two trade union confederations in the country, the National Union of Guinean Workers and the General Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, condemned the coup, and called on all workers to stay away from work until constitutional order was restored. On 18 April, Reporters Without Borders (RWB) condemned the restrictions imposed on the right to information, including threats to journalists, media censorship, and urged the military junta to restore the media's right to report the news freely. On 20 April, the Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League also condemned the coup and the political agreement signed by the military junta and its political allies, and demanded the release of all detainees and the restoration of constitutional order (United Nations Security Council. 2012, 4-5).

Furthermore, NGOs like “*Voz di Paz*” (Voice of Peace), a Bissau-Guinean NGO focused on political and humanitarian action. They included women's associations, traditional chiefs, and religious leaders, as well as social and occupational groups. On 16

November 2012, “*Voz di Paz*” issued an appeal for the preparation of a new social contract under the auspices of the Bishop of Bissau. The NGO representatives explained that their approach was the result of a thorough reflection on the trajectory of Guinea-Bissau since independence. In this context, it was necessary to formulate a vision for Guinea-Bissau based on a new social contract between the state and the civil society. In any case, the population seemed to understand the civil society organizations’ lessons as there was no violence during the 2014 presidential election (African Union Peace and Security 2013, 6). This variable is “met.”

### Case Study 3: Mali 2012

#### Crisis Background

The 2012 Malian crisis found its roots in the Tuareg revolt. As historical inhabitants of northern Mali and fighting French occupation, the Tuareg were disappointed at not getting their own state when Mali acquired independence. Members of the semi-nomadic Tuareg community, who inhabit parts of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya, have periodically rebelled against the Malian state to claim their independence of what they see as their historic homeland in the north, which they refer to as *Azawad* (Arieff 2013, 6).

The Tuareg initiated a rebellion for the first time in 1963, but it resulted in a brutal suppression by the Malian army. The fathers of present MNLA’s commanders died during those conflicts. Due to the severe drought in the 1970s and the continuous conflict against the Malian government, many Tuareg migrated to Libya, Algeria, and other countries. Further Tuareg rebellions broke out in 1990 and 2006, reflecting their continued anger. The different peace agreements failed to solve the problem. In the early

2000s, an outside actor increased that problem of insecurity. As the Algerian civil war was ending, Algerian militant factions, known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC in French), moved into the Sahara and Sahel. That faction later constituted Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and conducted raids, kidnappings for ransoms, and smuggling activities. In 2011, as the regime of Khadafy in Libya was falling, the migrated Tuareg combatants, who supported him, began returning with their weapons to Mali to create officially the MNLA in October 2011. It represented a fusion of the National Movement of the Azawad (MNA), created in November 2010, and the National Alliance of Tuareg of Mali (ANTM) founded by the late Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, a rebel exiled to Libya. The organization benefitted from the fighters and weapons as well as defections of Malian Tuareg soldiers, who previously integrated into the security forces following past peace accords. In early 2012, Mali looked toward a new presidential election, which the Tuaregs saw as an opportunity to make their demands heard. The MNLA, along with other fighters belonging to the Tuareg-led Islamist faction named Ansar Din, attacked and drove the Malian national army out of northern Malian cities. On January 2012, a massacre of Malian troops and civilians involving MNLA, AQIM, and Ansar Din took place at Aguelhok. That event triggered protests by military families. The army mutinied, accusing the government of lack of support. The situation culminated with the 21-22 March 2012 coup that removed President Amadou Toumani Touré from power, and installed the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and Rule of Law (CNRDRE), led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo. ECOWAS and other regional and international organizations, such as the AU and UN, condemned the coup and looked for ways to reestablish a constitutional order. That

political unrest led to a coalition of armed groups composed of MNLA, Islamists from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO in French), and Ansar Din, accelerating their offensive to the south. From 29 March to 2 April 2012, they took control of all northern Mali regions (Kidal, Gao, Tombouctou), declaring Azawad independence on 6 April 2012, and threatened to continue southward. In between negotiations to return power to the civilians, soldiers of the republican guard, loyal to the overthrown President Amadou Toumani Toure, launched an unsuccessful counter-coup on 1-2 May 2012. On the other side, the coalition between the MNLA and the Islamists ended by June 2012. MUJAO and AQIM Islamists imposed themselves and ousted the MNLA from the key city of Gao (Thurston and Lebovich 2013, 3-5). In September 2012, as the Islamist armed group of MUJAO advanced south to seize the cities of Douentza and Konna in the Mopti region, Mali's government, realizing the scope of the problem, called explicitly for the first time for international support for military operations in the north (Arieff 2013, 5). So ECOWAS not only had to help reestablish the constitutional power in Mali, but also to restore its territorial integrity of the northern regions controlled by the Tuaregs, and, particularly most important, by Islamist groups.



Figure 5. Northern Mali Conflict Situation in January 2013.

Source: Herachio Blo, "Northern Mali Conflict (2012-Present)," 19 January 2013, accessed 19 February 2017, <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=1583281>.

## ECOWAS Political and Military Commitment

### Early Warning

ECOWAS was aware of the situation in Mali prior to its deterioration. According to West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), a component of ECOWARN, the indicators to the instability through the early warning signs were very evident. Amongst these signs were the obscure and vague information about the situation of the conflicts in

the north, the proliferation of arms, which worsened following the end of the Libyan crisis, and military wives protesting for further support of military operations in the north. To respond to the early warning information, ECOWAS and the AU convened a joint, extraordinary meeting of heads of states, 20-21 March 2012 in the Malian capital to discuss and develop a way forward towards addressing the growing crisis in Northern Mali (WANEP 2012, 1).

In addition, the International Crisis Group (ICG) warned about the situation a long time ahead in 2005, stating that Mali “runs the greatest risk of any West African country other than Nigeria of violent Islamist activity.” This warning was based on observations similar to the 2009 drafting of a family code that would have expanded and guaranteed a number of women’s rights, which was fiercely opposed by Malian civic and religious groups (Arieff 2013, 6). However, ECOWAS did not prevent the coup as if it did not understand the scope of the problem. Therefore, this variable is assessed as “somewhat met.”

### Diplomatic Actions

During this crisis, ECOWAS showed effective diplomatic actions to bring back constitutional order. ECOWAS mediation was mixed with pressure on the military junta. After condemning the coup, a joint African Union and ECOWAS diplomatic mission met representatives of the junta on 23 March 2012 for negotiations. Following the meeting of 27 March 2012, ECOWAS placed peacekeeping troops on standby for a possible military intervention. On 29 March 2012, ECOWAS put pressure on the junta. It announced that Mali faced the closure of its land borders and freezing of its assets in other countries if the junta did not return power to constitutional authorities within seventy-two hours.

Captain Sanogo then agreed to hold elections in response to the ECOWAS position, but did not release a timetable. On 2 April 2012, as the junta did not satisfy ECOWAS demands, severe sanctions against Mali began. Mali's accounts in the Central Bank of West African States were frozen, and Mali's land borders were closed. Later on 5 April 2012, they reached an agreement. The National Assembly of Mali Speaker Dioncounda Traore would become interim president and oversee new elections, and the mutinying soldiers would be given amnesty. On his inauguration, Traore pledged to "wage a total and relentless war" against the Tuareg rebels. However, the junta gave the impression they still wanted to have a hand in public administration. In the new government, they occupied three ministries (defense, interior and internal security). Besides, when ECOWAS announced a twelve-month transition deadline until presidential and the legislative elections and ECOWAS troops would be deployed to Mali to ensure a peaceful transition, on 29 April 2012, Sanogo refused the proposal (Okeke et al. 2014, 6-7). ECOWAS negotiated with Sanogo, and granted him the status of former head of state on 21 May 2012. ECOWAS tried to contain Sanogo, but he continued to involve himself in the management of the country. His name became associated with the assault against the interim president on 22 May 2012 by protesters and the arrest of the interim Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra on 11 December 2012 (Arieff 2013, 5).

Meanwhile, the beginning of French military Operation Serval, followed by ECOWAS' troops arrival, gave Sanogo no chance of influence in public affairs. The election of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2013 completed the transition. ECOWAS condemned the atrocities of Islamist terrorist groups on the population, but could not negotiate with them, because those groups were stood firm in their goal to



transform Mali into an Islamic state. However, ECOWAS continued to support negotiations between the government of Mali and all independence-claiming groups, especially MNLA. Ultimately, that mediation with ECOWAS, along with UN, AU, EU, and OCI, resulted in the Algiers Agreement, signed between 15 May and 20 June 2015, symbolizing the cessation of hostilities. In regards of these actions, this variable is “met.”

### Strong Military Coalition

In the early days of the crisis, ECOWAS manifested a desire to send troops in Mali to restore the constitutional order and the sovereignty of Mali. This means that ECOWAS was not just going to put pressure on the junta, but it needed to fight the terrorist groups. The UN supported this idea with UNSCRs 2071, 2085, and 2100. However, ECOWAS failed to deploy until Operation Serval was launched. Different reasons exist for this delay. In fact, some countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, supported the idea, but some wanted to promote negotiations; Burkina was one of them. Lack of consensus among the ECOWAS member states and the Malian Armed Forces’ disapproval of any foreign military presence brought confusion and compromised the possibility to deploy the ECOWAS troops. Additionally, the fact that Mauritania and Algeria were not ECOWAS members had a negative impact on Mali since these countries are neighbors (Manyevere 2013, 36). Another reason was this type of threat (terrorism) was new to ECOWAS, and most of the countries were thinking about their own borders. These considerations were added to readiness issues with some of the troops; therefore, they could not respect the initial schedule. Even Nigeria, which was due to lead the mission, warned about a premature arrival of the troops in Mali without completing their training and full equipment (The Guardian 2013). As the issues of lack of consensus and

readiness were obvious in preventing ECOWAS' component of AFISMA to deploy at time, this variable is assessed "somewhat met."

## Supporting Partners

### Support of Other Nations and Communities

Following the coup, the African Union (AU) suspended Mali on 23 March 2012 until restoration of constitutional order. The UN and EU did the same just to put pressure on the junta. Some countries such as the U.S. suspended their aid to Mali. On 3 April 2012, the UN Security Council began work on a resolution backing the ECOWAS sanctions against the junta. All these organizations condemned the idea of Azawad independency from Mali declared by the MNLA or Tuareg rebels on 6 April 2012 (Okeke et al. 2014, 6-7). The UNSC backed the AU and ECOWAS with three resolutions. The UNSCR 2071 authorized the regional and international community to intervene militarily. The UNSCR 2085 authorized the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and UNSCR 2100 authorized the transformation of AFISMA and extended it to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). With the delay of the AFISMA intervention, France launched Operation Serval on 11 January 2013, supported by Chad. The European Union approved the concept for a mission to train and restructure the Malian security forces on 20 December 2012 (Arieff 2013, 5). Britain, Australia, Germany, the European Union, Denmark, and the United States provided logistical support to France (Manyevere 2013, 38). Along with ECOWAS, these organizations supported the negotiations between Mali and the Tuareg armed groups, which ultimately resulted in the signature of the Algiers agreement in 2015. This variable is valued as "met."

### Implication of Civil Society Organizations

The integration of CSO in the resolution of this crisis was obvious. Even though northern Mali was difficult to access at that time, these organizations had warned ECOWAS earlier through WANEP. As stated in UNSCR 2085, ECOWAS mandates directed AFISMA to work closely with these organizations to improve human conditions. UNSCR 2100 also directed MINUSMA to integrate CSO (UNSC 2012, 6; UNSC 2013, 7). In this respect, the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) continued to operate in Gao through local partners. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC) continued to give fuel to Gao's generators to ensure the city's water supply, and supplied Gao and Timbuktu hospitals with medicines. Even local groups of goodwill like *Cri du Coeur* (Cry of the Heart) collected money and aid donations from Bamako residents, and sent a convoy to the north, sometimes accepting MNLA escorts between Douentza and Gao (IRIN 2012). These organizations also played an important role in convincing the population who left the north to return, even if in a subdued manner. In this respect, this variable is assessed as "met."

### Synthesis of Cases Analysis

Overall, ECOWAS responded to the three cases using the same process. However, the results are different due to the character of each crisis. The synthesis of the analysis will be the subject of interpretation, and the results are illustrated in the following table.

Table 4. Assessment of ECOWAS Response to Crisis				
Variables		Crises		
		Côte d'Ivoire 2010	Guinea Bissau 2012	Mali 2012
<b>ECOWAS Political and Military Commitment</b>	Early Warning	Met	Somewhat Met	Somewhat Met
	Diplomatic Actions	Somewhat Met	Met	Met
	Strong Military Coalition	Not Met	Met	Somewhat Met
<b>Supporting Partners</b>	Support of other Nations and Communities	Met	Met	Met
	Implication of Civil Society Organizations	Met	Met	Met

*Source:* Created by author.

### Summary

Chapter 4 shows how ECOWAS responded to these three cases using both political and military approaches. The analysis includes five variables relating to preventive and reactive actions, which the organization used to undertake in several crises. The synthesis of the analysis, compiled in the above table will be the subject of interpretations. These interpretations, as well as other recommendations for a better performance of the organization, will be discussed in chapter 5.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

The purpose of this research is to find relevant proposals to support an optimal level of collective security within ECOWAS. In this respect, different points including the understanding of collective security fundamentals, ECOWAS's collective security mechanisms, and the success or the failure of using these mechanisms, ECOWAS's actions to meet the fundamentals of collective security, and the effectiveness of the ESF were examined throughout the thesis.

This chapter will provide proposals to improve ECOWAS's collective security capabilities based on the interpretation of the findings from analysis of the case studies of Côte d'Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2012), and Mali (2012) crises in chapter 4.

#### Summary of Findings

Overall, chapter 4 shows that ECOWAS's collective security problems reside within divergent political positions of its member states when facing emergent situations. These divergences derive mostly from the primacy of the states' individual interests over the collectivity. The analysis of these three cases confirms:

1. Destabilizing situations involving military juntas alone are easier to solve by ECOWAS.
2. Sometimes ECOWAS does not exploit quickly the information from its early warning systems, causing a delay in making an effective response.

3. ECOWAS is able to successfully undertake diplomatic actions. However, some negotiations fail due to some poor choices of mediators.
4. In the case of crises, support of ECOWAS's actions by member and external states to the organization depends mostly on their individual interests, and this can affect the organization's efforts.
5. The issue of states' sovereignty remains an obstacle to ECOWAS military intervention
6. ECOWAS members are politically more prompt to commit their troops in peacekeeping and peacebuilding rather than peace enforcement operations.

#### Interpretation of Findings

ECOWAS continues to be the primary actor in West African crisis resolution. The organization is structured in a way that favors taking both preventive and reactive actions. However, it continues to experience shortcomings.

The analysis of ECOWAS's response to these three cases shows that the sub-regional organization was most successful in Guinea-Bissau. This can be explained by the scope of the crises, and how proactively ECOWAS performed in handling the crisis.

In reality, ECOWAS seems to be more effective in solving crises in which the military is the main cause of the problem and has little political or external support. In Guinea-Bissau, the junta had no support, neither political nor external. This situation was not the case for Côte d'Ivoire since the regular military was still loyal to the president. The Malian case was more complex because it was a combination of two crises. Solving the problem of the junta was, more or less easy. However, solving the problem of the armed groups, especially the terrorists was difficult.

As illustrated in table 4, it was easier to undertake diplomatic actions in Guinea-Bissau and in Mali to a certain extent. The reason was, in Guinea Bissau, the junta obviously declared that their main problem was the presence of Angolan troops, and no political party wanted to support the junta. Therefore, the negotiations focused on replacing the Angolan troops, setting a temporary government, and organizing elections. As for Mali, although the junta had ambitions to lead the country, they finally relinquished the power because no country endorsed them, and the terrorists, who were gaining terrain, were a threat to them. Undertaking diplomatic action with the armed group claiming independence (MNLA) was even easier after isolating the terrorists who were looking for international recognition. Contrary to the Cote d'Ivoire case, diplomatic actions were difficult as each camp was convinced about its victory of the elections, and still believed in its military support. Some emissaries were seen as partial or simply unfit to give lessons to opposing camps.

Overall, early warning existed in all cases, but in different levels. Understanding the situation, ECOWAS maintained its presence in Cote d'Ivoire throughout the UN mission as it included troops from ECOWAS countries. This was not so in the case of Mali and Guinea-Bissau. Even if reports from ECOWAS organs indicated potential crises, ECOWAS did not take enough actions to prevent the crises.

The formation of a strong military coalition was met in Guinea-Bissau, contrary to the other two cases. This was mainly due of the scale of the crisis, as the situation did not require a robust force, and the mission was oriented to peacebuilding. On the contrary, there was no commitment of ECOWAS forces in Cote d'Ivoire because of the divergence of political positions of member states. As for Mali, it was more or less met

because the deployment of ECOWAS was delayed. Besides the lack of will of countries to contribute in troops, there was a problem of readiness. Mali is a landlocked country, and many troops from contributing countries did not have strategic air lift capability. Most did not also have experience in combatting terrorists. Additionally, Malians and their military were not favorable to welcoming foreign troops in their country.

The support from other nations and community support existed in all cases. However, the main challenge resides in the difference of positions, especially from countries of influence. China and Russia condemned the UN and France's position in Côte d'Ivoire, accusing them of ignoring their role. Such positions could encourage Gbagbo to persist on his claim. Some of the AU and ECOWAS members might also need to reexamine their own stance about the case, as they would like to preserve good relations with these two countries.

In all cases, civil society organizations participated in supporting ECOWAS actions. The reason was that civil society organizations, especially those carrying humanitarian actions, were close to the population and opposing camps because they all needed their services. However, their mission became complicated in northern Mali when terrorists occupied the territory.

In view of these cases, ECOWAS faced obstacles that prevented its ideal performance. The real problem concerning early warning is its timely exploitation by ECOWAS to take appropriate action. ECOWAS may have information of a potential crisis, but decisions about what to do can be too late.

In diplomatic actions, the choice of inappropriate mediators can delay or fail the negotiations. In Côte d'Ivoire case, the Gbagbo camp suspected Burkina Faso's president



of interference in Cote d'Ivoire's internal affairs since 2002, and considered him partial to Ouattara's camp. Additionally, the choice of Raila Odinga, the former Prime Minister of Kenya, was not ideal, as he was involved in a similar situation that resulted in large-scale violence in Kenya. Therefore, it caused him to be less than effective in developing a consensus among the opposing camps in Côte d'Ivoire.

The obstacles to a strong military coalition were caused by three problems. First, member states were not obliged to contribute to troops. Therefore, they acted to preserve their individual interest. Ghana refused to participate in a military action, because it worried about its citizens living in Côte d'Ivoire. In the case of Mali, some countries did not initially show willingness to contribute in troops because they were focusing to secure their borders.

Second, there still existed a problem of readiness in the ESF. It was clear that the ESF was not prepared to deploy quickly, due to training and logistical problems. Mali is landlocked, and not all ECOWAS countries had air capabilities to project their forces quickly into locations. This can explain, in part, why France was the first in the field.

Third, there was a reticence of host a nation to welcome the ESF. For example, the Malian people clung to their national pride and integrity. It was only at the last moment that the interim president officially called for support.

In consideration of these shortcomings, ECOWAS can be more effective in implementing collective security if it takes into account some of the following recommendations.

### Recommendations

To address its collective security mechanisms, ECOWAS should adopt several measures to strengthen the institution, develop the ESF's capabilities, improve its preventive actions, and continue to maintain close partnerships.

ECOWAS should proactively exploit its early warning system findings by making decisions quickly, either diplomatically or militarily. AU, UN, and the host nation or opposing parties should support those decisions. Such steps would help resolve early intra-state problems, which are likely to degenerate. For example, if ECOWAS took responsibility of the security sector reform from Angolan troops in Guinea-Bissau, it could have prevented the coup, as the junta would not have had justification.

In terms of negotiations, ECOWAS should do its best to have credible persons to represent it. It should avoid sending emissaries who have been involved in similar cases that resulted in atrocities because they cannot be credible mediators among opposing camps. Additionally, a suspected emissary of favoritism by opposing camps should not take part in negotiations

ECOWAS should be strengthened by endowing the institution with certain authorities over its member states. The constitutive Act of ECOWAS should set the obligation to participate in peace operations as a condition to be a member state, and the subordination of individual interests in cases where the security of the community is at stake. In this way, member states would have the obligation to contribute troops and funding. ECOWAS should then have the responsibility to protect and prevent atrocities, such as those that resulted from the Cote d'Ivoire crisis. For such actions, it would be

necessary for the AU and the UN to support ECOWAS with timely mandates and additional resources.

To convince host nations or opposing camps to accept the ESF, ECOWAS should primarily rely on negotiations. ECOWAS should leverage civil society organizations because they are close to the population.

ECOWAS should continuously develop the ESF's capabilities to maintain readiness. This step will include training as well as providing equipment. It should start from member countries' readiness. It would be a good to take lessons from the NATO Response Force, especially in organizing and regularly participating in combined training exercises. The ESF should also have sufficient air and naval capability for a rapid projection of its forces.

#### Recommendations for Future Studies

In order to maintain collective security and achieve its fundamental objectives of economic integration, ECOWAS should focus on intra-state problems that affect the whole community. These problems mainly concern young people. The flow of illegal immigration to Europe, using unsecured lines of communications such as boats, has led to many deaths. They constitute easy targets of recruitment for armed groups, including terrorists. This problem is becoming a major collective security issue for the community. Therefore, it is important to reflect on how ECOWAS can integrate the problem of youth in its collective security plan.

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